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ABSTRACT 
The dramatic rise and relative political success of the Nepal Communist Party-Maoist    
(NCP-M), calls into question the conventional explanations for the success or failure of 
violent Maoist insurgencies in the current global environment. The Nepalese insurgency 
ended in relative triumph through a negotiated political settlement that co-opted its major 
demands. Furthermore, the Maoists scored an impressive electoral victory that marked 
the beginning of a process of complete transformation of the traditional sociopolitical 
structure of Nepal. By comparing the failed Maoist insurgencies of the Shining Path of 
Peru and the Communist Party of the Philippines and the New People’s Army 
(CPP/NPA) with the NCP-M, this thesis offers an alternative explanation that links the 
nature of approach taken by a Maoist insurgency to the outcome. The thesis argues that, 
in order to succeed, an insurgency must first shed the ideological dogma and its emphasis 
on violent means because of the limits and constraints in executing classic Maoist 
people’s war in the twenty-first century. Instead, they should focus on exploiting political 
opportunities created by initial military gains while popular support remains high. This 
thesis also highlights the benefits of employing political negotiations and foreign 
mediation as a genuine means for achieving both political change and sustainable peace.  
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I. THESIS PROPOSAL 
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
During the Cold war, the Soviet Union and China supported left-wing 
insurgencies in developing nations to spread communist ideologies. Many such 
insurgencies were inspired by the strategy of “people’s war” adopted by Mao and his 
Chinese Communist Party. Communist ideology started to lose its appeal in the late 
1980s, and, following the demise of the Soviet Union, communist regimes across the 
world started to fall. Simultaneously, Chinese modernization and a shift toward economic 
liberalization led to the decline of Maoism in China. Interestingly, Maoist insurgencies in 
general did not lose their significance as a potent method for political change. Despite the 
end of the cold war, Maoist strategies remained attractive to several groups around the 
world, especially in Asia. 
Nepal is one place where, despite an unfavorable international environment, a 
Maoist insurgency under the leadership of the Nepal Communist Party-Maoist (NCP-M) 
began in 1996, gained strength in the next 12 years, and ultimately succeeded in heading 
the national government in 2008. While the NCP-M could not defeat the government 
forces or displace the old establishment completely, it did succeed in making sure that the 
government accommodated their most important demands: abolition of the two-century-
old monarchy, election of a constituent assembly to draft a new democratic constitution, 
and the adoption of federalism. The NCP-M took control of the government in Nepal 
after securing the largest number of seats in the Constituent Assembly election in 2008. 
The NCP-M led the government even though the United States still listed the party on the 
Terrorist Exclusion List.1 Although the government led by the NCP-M stepped down in 
2009 after a failed attempt to sack the Army chief, the party’s tremendous success in 
transforming the country’s political system remains a puzzle for many analysts.  
                                                 
1 Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, “Terrorist Exclusion List,” March 16, 2009, U.S. 
Department of State, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/other/des/123086.htm  (accessed June 5, 2010). 
 2
The mystery is more interesting because similar movements in other parts of the 
world do not seem to be enjoying such success. The Shining Path of Peru started its 
armed struggle modeled along the Maoist doctrine in May 1980. The insurgency quickly 
spread across the nation and was able to effectively challenge the state. However, the 
insurgency collapsed following the capture of its leader, Dr. Ruben Abimael Guzman 
Reinoso, alias Gonjalo, on September 12, 1992. Mark Chernick states that by the late 
1980s support for the Shining Path had “vanished and it was faced with a social rebellion 
against its brutal methods, militarism, and ideological demands.”2 The insurgency failed 
to achieve its goals and, interestingly, ended in military defeat and social rejection and 
not in negotiations, because the Shining Path never entered into negotiations or talks.3 
Similarly, the Communist Party of the Philippines and its New People’s Army 
(CPP/NPA) started an armed rebellion in 1969 after becoming disgruntled with the 
inadequate political gains of the original Communist Party of the Philippines (the PKP). 
The new party was led by Jose Maria Sison and based almost entirely on Mao’s doctrine 
of peasant-based mass revolution.4 The movement gathered strength with the election of 
Ferdinand Marcos as president in 1969. Marcos was forced to call elections in 1986 
following the political unrest created by the assassination of Benigno Aquino, Jr.5  
However, the CPP decided to boycott the election, which gave the advantage to Mrs. 
Corazon Acquino, widow of Mr. Aquino, who gained power by ousting Marcos. The 
boycott of the 1986 elections by the CPP/NPA and continued persistence with an armed 
movement resulted in the loss of popular support that was crucial to its success.  Unlike 
the NCP-M, who seized political opportunity by participating in the interim government 
in 2007 and participating in elections in 2008, the CPP/NPA neglected the opportunity 
for political participation. 
                                                 
2 Mark Chernick, “PCP-SL: The Defeat of Sendero Luminoso,” in Terror, Insurgency, and the State: 
Ending Protracted Conflicts, eds. Marianne Heiberg, Brendan O’Leary, and John Tirman, 231 
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007). 
3 Ibid., 291. 
4 Gregg R. Jones, Red Revolution (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 18. 
5 Ibid. 
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Both the Shining Path and CPP drew inspiration from Marxism and Maoism and 
waged similar forms of people’s war. All three cases, including the NCP-M, share 
similarities in terms of having fulfilled most of the prerequisites for an insurgency to be 
successful: availability of a cause to fight for, active popular support, geographical 
conditions conducive to the conducting of insurgency operations, a weak state 
government, active external assistance, and an informational advantage.6 However, the 
Shining Path and CPP both failed after making initial gains, whereas the NCP-M 
succeeded in achieving its objectives. In this context, what explains the relative success 
of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal under the leadership of the NCP-M as compared to the 
failure of the other Maoist insurgencies?  
B. IMPORTANCE  
In the modern world, communist insurgencies are not expected to succeed 
because communist ideology in general has lost the ability to motivate people in most 
places. The twenty-first century insurgents face many difficulties. They have difficulty in 
recruiting, organizing, and fighting superior armed forces of the government and can  no 
longer be confident of external support. As J. Bowyer Bell argues, “The assets of the state 
are so apparent, so compelling, and so easy … and the prospects of the rebel are so faint, 
that only the most optimistic risk an armed struggle.”7 Contrary to such observations, 
insurgencies have continued to grow in parts of the world.  
The success of the NCP-M-led Maoist insurgency is alarming because of its 
possible influence on other insurgent groups across the world. One example is that of the 
Indian Maoist insurgents who have recently intensified their violent campaign against the 
Indian state. Thus, it is important to identify the reasons for the success of Maoists in 
Nepal so that these reasons can help in formulating counterinsurgency strategies in India 
and elsewhere.  
                                                 
6 Frank H. Zimmerman, “Why Insurgencies Fail: Examining Post World War II Failed Insurgencies 
Utilizing the Prerequisites of Successful Insurgencies as a Framework” (master’s thesis, Naval 
Postgraduate School, 2007), 1–10. 
7 Bowyer, J. Bell, “The Armed Struggle and Underground Intelligence: An Overview,” Studies in 
Conflict and Terrorism 17, (August 1994): 115–150. 
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If the growth of the Maoist insurgency in Nepal around the turn of the century is 
in defiance of “several layers of conventional wisdom about politics and society,” its 
political success is astounding.8 The violent campaign waged by the NCP-M in Nepal 
ended after it signed a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) with the government in 
November 2006. The CPA and subsequent agreements led to the co-option of major 
political demands of the NCP-M, and the NCP-M went on to win the post-war elections 
for the constituent assembly. This unique journey of the Nepalese Maoist insurgency 
highlights the importance of a balanced application of classical military methods 
combined with a realistic political approach. Hence it is of deeper academic value for 
both the scholars and practitioners of counterinsurgency.9  
This case is also important from the point of view of the role foreign actors can 
play in ending an insurgency. The historic 12-point agreement of November 2005 that 
brought the NCP-M closer to the democratic parties was facilitated by the Indian 
government. Indian facilitation and mediation was crucial in the conclusion of the Delhi 
pact that led to the peace process.10 Additionally, the involvement of the European 
Union, United States, and United Kingdom was also helpful. 
This study assumes significance in the current global context because of the 
enmeshed nature of terrorism and insurgency. While terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda 
wage transnational insurgencies, domestic insurgencies are drawing important lessons 
from international terrorist organizations. Under these circumstances, it becomes 
necessary to connect the two disciplines. The case of the Nepalese Maoist insurgency is 
important to study because the insurgents extensively employed terrorist tactics before 
coming to power at the state level. 
                                                 
8 Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari, “Evolution and Growth of the Maoist Insurgency,” in The 
Maoist Insurgency in Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty First Century, eds. Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. 
Pahari, 3–23 (Kathmandu: Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series, 2010). 
9 R. Andrew Nickson, “Democratization and the Growth of Communism in Nepal: A Peruvian 
Scenario in the Making,” in Understanding the Maoist Movement of Nepal, ed. Deepak Thapa, 3–9 
(Kathmandu: Martin Chautari Publications, 2003).  
10 Bishnu Raj Upreti, “External Engagement in Nepal’s Armed Conflict,” in The Maoist Insurgency in 
Nepal: Revolution in the Twenty-First Century, eds. Mahendra Lawoti and Anup K. Pahari, 219–235 
(Kathmandu: Routledge Contemporary South Asia Series, 2010). 
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The Nepalese case is unique because of the NCP-M’s openness to participating in 
the political process. While the NCP-M was actively pursuing armed action against the 
state, it also left the political option open. The Maoists always claimed their readiness to 
enter into substantial dialogue with the government during their violent campaign. In 
2001, only five years after it began its insurgency, the NCP-M entered into formal and 
serious dialogue with the government. This feature is not apparent in the other two cases 
(the Shining Path and CPP/NPA), where the military approach remained dominant. In the 
end, it was through the political process that the NCP-M achieved its political objectives. 
This case demonstrates the limited utility of the military-dominant approach and 
emphasizes the need for a balanced politico-military approach to insurgency in the 
current global context. It is, however, noteworthy that negotiation and political 
participation become meaningful only at a certain point of time, especially when the 
parties reach the stage of stalemate. Thus identification of the right moment for political 
settlement is of critical value.  
Furthermore, by highlighting the impracticality of the classical military-dominant 
Maoist approach in the current global context, this study contributes to the conflict   de-
escalation effort. The case presents important policy implications for governments and 
agencies involved in conflict prevention and counterinsurgency operations. It is equally 
useful in answering the question facing “diplomats, practitioners of conflict resolution, 
and scholars on how to bring a conflict to an early end before more blood is shed, money 
squandered, and opportunities lost.”11 Additionally, it cautions against the possible 
resurgence of left-wing, particularly Maoist-inspired, armed movements in various parts 
of the world including India, the Philippines, and Peru.   
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES 
I argue that the success of the NCP-M in an increasingly unfavorable domestic, 
regional, and global situation can be explained by its willingness to adopt a political 
approach over a military one. Although the party’s development was based upon the 
                                                 
11 Mariannne Heiberg, Brendan O’Leary, and John Tirman, eds. Terror, Insurgency, and the State: 
Ending Protracted Conflicts (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2007), 2. 
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classic Maoist “people’s war” doctrine, its leaders were ready to accept political 
negotiation and political participation as a genuine means for achieving their main 
objectives. This explains why the Shining Path and CPP/NPA’s dogmatic military 
approach directed toward overthrowing the incumbent regime by the use of extreme 
violence met with failure and the flexibility of the Nepalese Maoists in pursuing a 
politically-accommodating approach saw success. 
It is, however, equally important to identify when and whether the insurgents are 
truly willing to negotiate. The political process can be effective only when there is a 
possibility of achieving a genuine political solution, which is preceded by clear and 
unambiguous demands. Veronique Dudouet argues that political engagement with 
(insurgent/terrorist) groups is desirable only under certain circumstances. First, the group 
should be interested in having a political solution, and, second, it should be seen as the 
legitimate representative of the community. Third, it should be able to deliver a peace 
agreement, and, last; political engagement with the insurgent group should generate 
significant behavioral change.12 The Nepalese Maoists had very clear political demands 
for electing a constituent assembly to draft a republican constitution, which made it easy 
to negotiate with them.  This was very different from the abstract and utopian goals in 
other cases. The NCP-M also commanded a degree of legitimacy because of its 
indigenous and inclusive composition.  
The NCP-M was continually involved in the negotiation process even while the 
military action continued. There were two major formal negotiations conducted between 
the Maoists and the government in 2001 and 2003. Although both the talks were failures, 
they established the foundation for future agreements. This process of simultaneous 
political and military action is completely absent in the case of the Shining Path, which 
was never willing to negotiate.13 Similarly, the CPP/NPA also refused to participate in 
                                                 
12 Vernonique Dudouet, “Mediating Peace with Proscribed Armed Groups,” Special Report, No. 239, 
United States Institute of Peace, May 2010: 1–5.  
13 Nischal Nath Pandey, Nepal’s Maoist Movement and Implications for India and China (New Delhi: 
Manohar Publishers and Distributors, 2005), 91. 
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the elections in the 1950s and 1980s and chose to continue its armed struggle.14 The 
Nepalese Maoists have been criticized as revisionists for abandoning the people’s war for 
parliamentary politics, which makes them appear non-Maoist on the surface. But, as we 
shall see, they alone seem to completely grasp what Mao emphasized so much; the 
importance of politics.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Insurgency in its simplest form can be called a militant political movement. The 
U.S. Army Field Manual 3-24 defines it as “an organized movement aimed at the 
overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict.”15  
The newly expanded definition by the U.S. Department of the Army states that “an 
insurgency is an organized, protracted politico-military struggle designed to weaken the 
control and legitimacy of an established government, occupying power or other political 
authority while increasing insurgent control … insurgents use all available tools, 
political, informational, military, and economic … to overthrow the existing authority.”16 
The expanded definition of insurgency ably encompasses the multifaceted 
dimension of an insurgency and rightly points toward the politico-military nature of 
insurgency. It can be waged for various purposes, ranging from the demand for more 
political rights, self determination, and national liberation or  sociopolitical 
transformation. The Maoist insurgency is a socialist revolutionary insurgency and thus 
differs from the others primarily in its ideological motivations and the protracted form of 
people’s war that it practices. 
Among militant socialist revolutionary strategies, two successful approaches 
appear in history. The October Revolution led by Lenin in 1917 was an urban 
insurrection centered in the capital city and carried out with the organized support of the 
                                                 
14 Benedict J. Tria Kerkvliet, “Contemporary Philippine Leftist Politics in Historical Perspective,” in 
The Revolution Falters: The Left in Philippines Politics After 1986, ed. Patricio N. Abinales, 11 (Ithaca, 
New York: Southeast Asia Program Publications, 1996). 
15 U.S. Army Field Manual, FM, 3–24, Counterinsurgency, U.S. Department of Defense, 1. 
16 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms, (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, April 12, 2001, as amended 
through  November 9, 2006), 267. 
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trade unions, student and other groups, and even a section of the security forces. This 
insurrection needed to be swift, commanding the support of almost every section of 
society and effective in quickly replacing the government.17 Theoretically, this type of 
strategy demands a “revolutionary situation” where conditions are just right and the 
communist party can be the vanguard to lead the masses into the revolution. 
The other successful approach was adopted by Mao Tse Tung in China (1920–49) 
and followed by Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam (1946–54). They approached revolution 
through the strategy of “people’s war.” Looking into the environment of China where the 
proletariat working class was nearly absent, Mao concentrated on the peasantry and 
focused on the capture of rural areas.18 Mao advocated a strategy of encircling the cities 
by first capturing the countryside. He designed a people’s war strategy, which is 
conducted in a three-phased protracted form of warfare divided into Strategic Defense, 
Strategic Stalemate, and Strategic Offense.   
Many studies have been carried out on the Maoist form of insurgency because of 
its spectacular successes in China and Vietnam. These studies attempt to explain the 
“nature of Maoist insurgency” based upon the interpretation of the writings of Mao and 
other Maoist leaders and through case studies of insurgencies. Samuel Griffith makes a 
literary translation of the works of Mao and Mao’s theory on the means of the 
insurgency.19  Donald W. Hamilton explains it as a “method” and a “type” of warfare 
adopting the “protracted war strategy.”20  
While the general tendency to explain a Maoist insurgency as a military-
dominated strategy persists, there are some who argue the opposite point of view, that it 
is politically-dominated. Thomas A. Marks points to the pitfalls of focusing strictly on 
the military aspect of Maoist doctrine because the Maoist insurgency for him is primarily 
                                                 
17 Douglas S. Blaufarb and George K. Tanham, Who Will Win? A Key to the Puzzle of Revolutionary 
War  (New York: Crane Russak, 1989), 6–8. 
18 Ibid., 8. 
19 Mao Tse-tung, On Guerilla Warfare, trans. Samuel Griffith (Chicago: First Illinois Paperbacks, 
2000).  
20 Donald W. Hamilton, The Art of Insurgency: American Policy and the Failure of Strategy in 
Southeast Asia (Westport: Praeger Publishers Inc., 1998). 
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a political movement using multiple lines of operation in which violence is just one.21 
Similarly, Bard O’Neill categorizes insurgencies into “anarchists, egalitarian, 
traditionalist, pluralist, secessionist, reformist, and preservationist” because of the nature 
of their goals rather than the methods they use. He puts Maoist insurgency in the 
egalitarian category and calls it a political phenomenon.22 This exposes the conflict in the 
understanding of Maoist insurgency in terms of its approach.   
Two distinctly different perspectives on the nature of Maoist insurgency appear 
from the literature; one takes a military-dominant approach, treating it as a form of 
warfare, while the other takes a politically-dominant approach. Since Maoist doctrine 
remains one of the most successful of the militant, social-revolutionary strategies based 
upon a “people’s war,” there appears to be a stronger case in favor of the primacy of 
politics.23 Marks argue that Mao stated that all insurgencies are strategically political and 
directed operationally through multiple lines of operation.24 Similarly, Blufarb and 
Tanham argue that among the strategies of the Maoist, first is the priority of politics, 
meaning the supremacy of political organization over the armed element. They claim that 
Mao followed the Clausewitzian principle that “war is a continuation of politics by other 
means.” Then comes the popular support; for the Maoists, everything they do (including 
the military campaigns) is to achieve popular support, thus the emphasis is on the 
sociopolitical mobilization of the population for which terrorism and persuasion are 
employed.25  
This leads to the argument that, because of the reluctance to understand the nature 
of Maoist insurgency as a political strategy reliant upon violent methods, the 
counterinsurgency efforts are undermined in some cases. This also implies that if the 
insurgents lose track of their political priorities and get entangled in the process of 
violence alone, then success is most likely to elude them.  
                                                 
21 Thomas A. Marks, Maoist Insurgencies since Vietnam (New York: Taylor and Francis Inc., 1996). 
22 Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: Inside Modern Revolutionary Warfare (Washington: 
Brassey’s Inc., 1990).  
23 Blaufarb and Tanham, Who Will Win?, 6–8. 
24 Marks, Maoist Insurgencies since Vietnam, 335–337. 
25 Ibid., 339. 
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The rest of the literature that analyzes the success or failure of insurgencies takes 
a variety of approaches. One faction believes the framework of traditionally-identified 
prerequisites is necessary for the success of an insurgency. David Galula considers a 
cause to fight for, geographic condition, outside support, and weakness of the state as the 
prerequisites.26 Julian Paget emphasizes support from the local populace, mobility, and 
supplies.27 Theda Skocpol contends that the international environment is one of the major 
factors that contributes to the success or failure of revolutions.28 Mahendra Lawoti and 
Anup Pahari use the evaluation of the socio-economic environmental conditions 
combined with the role of leadership, influence of ideology and effectiveness of strategy 
as the framework for analyzing the success of the Nepalese Maoists.29  
Some even consider the approach of the counterinsurgent state as the factor that 
determines success or failure of the insurgency. Daniel Byman adds that the success or 
failure of a (proto) insurgent movement depends only in part (and at times only in small 
part) on its own campaign. The reaction of the state is often the most important factor in a 
movement’s overall success. In particular, states can disrupt organizations through 
various forms of policing and repression and can co-opt potential leaders and make them 
allies of the state.30 Marks and David Scott Palmer also point out that insurgents are 
unlikely to win on their own, and their victory is based upon a series of “inappropriate 
and erroneous policies” of the state that is countering them.31  
Timothy J. Lomperis states that, in revolutionary insurgency, the incumbents and 
insurgents unquestionably struggle for power and authority over their people. Thus, he 
                                                 
26 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, 4th ed. (London: Praeger, 1968), 5, 
cited by Zimmerman in Why Insurgencies Fail? 1–5. 
27 Julian Paget, Counter-Insurgency Campaigning (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), 11. 
28 Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions, (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 
1979), 19–24 quoted in Timothy J. Lomperis, From People’s War to People’s Rule: Insurgency, 
Intervention, and the Lessons of Vietnam (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 7. 
  
29 Lawoti and Pahari, “Evolution and Growth of the Maoist Insurgency,” 3–23. 
30 Daniel Byman, “Understanding Proto Insurgencies,” occasional paper, Counterinsurgency Study, 
no. 3 (RAND, National Defense Research Institute: 2007), 6–7. 
31 Thomas A. Marks and David Scott Palmer, “Radical Maoist Insurgents and Terrorist Tactics: 
Comparing Peru and Nepal,” Low Intensity Conflict and Law Enforcement 13, no. 2 (Autumn 2006): 8.     
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argues, “Insurgencies are won or lost by the relative amount of legitimacy the two 
competing sides achieve.”32 Highlighting the difference in approaches taken by the 
insurgents, he argues that “the mobilization of people’s war is exclusive in its drive for a 
monopolistic seizure of power, whereas power sharing and compromise is called for by 
democrats.”33 If the incumbents can take the risks of including insurgents in elections 
then people’s war as a strategy is either preempted or co-opted.”34 In summary, he argues 
that political participation is the best method to end insurgencies. 
Since every insurgency has a different context, in addition to the common 
variables, certain idiosyncratic conditions pertaining to the particular case or cases 
usually are instrumental in tipping the outcome in favor of insurgent groups or against 
them. Therefore, these conditions are considered crucial in explaining each particular 
case.  
Marks argues that most Maoist insurgencies are unsuccessful because they fail to 
advance simultaneously along the multiple lines of effort outlined by Mao. These lines of 
effort are violence without politics, the winning of allies outside the movement, the use of 
nonviolence to make violence more effective, and the garnering of international 
support.35 Marks also recognizes that the integral nature of violence in all phases of 
insurgency, but he cautions that it is “used to the situation to eliminate resistance so that 
insurgent politics can produce mass and resource mobilization.”36 Thus, he again 
emphasizes the value of the political approach and the simultaneous use of political and 
military means for success.  
O’Neill argues that the use of political resources and instruments of violence in 
accordance with a carefully crafted strategy are the main determinants of insurgent 
success. He argues that any strategy used by the insurgents that can maximize the 
                                                 
32 Timothy J. Lomperis, From People’s War to People’s Rule: Insurgency, Intervention, and the 
Lessons of Vietnam, (Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 6. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Ibid. 
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effectiveness of the political and military techniques employed will achieve success. He 
elaborates that the strategy adopted will vary according to six variables, “environment, 
popular support, organization, unity, external support and the government response.”37 
Here O’Neill has emphasized the need to have a political strategy that is able to marshal 
the available elements considered to be the prerequisites of success. 
Despite the prescribed factors and importance of politics, insurgencies adopt 
various approaches as they deem them suitable to their specific conditions. To achieve 
success they must adapt continually to the ever-evolving environment around them. 
Fixation with prescribed and historical models may lead them to failure, whereas realistic 
assessment and selection of appropriate means are more likely to lead to success. Thus, 
the approach taken by an insurgency becomes important to the outcome of the 
insurgency. 
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
I will employ the comparative method to determine the reason for the success of 
the Nepalese Maoist insurgency led by the NCP-M as opposed to the failure of similar 
Maoist insurgencies in Peru and the Philippines. I will broadly compare the factors and 
strategies considered to be prerequisites for insurgent success. I will attempt to track the 
general trend and inclination of the party ideology and political objectives, and I will also 
analyze the main strategies employed by the insurgencies in order to determine the 
predominance of military only or a balance of politico–military in their overall approach. 
This will be executed by identifying elements of political flexibility in terms of 
willingness for dialogue and negotiation or participation in elections, if there are any, by 
the insurgents.  
While comparing the Shining Path and the CPP/NPA with the NCP-M, I will 
illustrate that despite similarities in environmental factors and successful employment of 
traditional and prescriptive methods, the other two failed due to their overemphasis on a 
dogmatic adherence to ideology, a lack of tangible political objectives, an overemphasis 
on the military means, and an inaccurate assessment of regional and global situations. 
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The Nepalese Maoist insurgency, on the other hand, succeeded because of their balanced 
politico-military approach. I will use both primary as well as secondary data for this 
purpose. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis is divided into five parts. The introductory chapter covers the 
contextualizing background, the research question, literature review, and the hypothesis. 
The second, third, and fourth chapters will consist of the comparative case studies of the 
Shining Path, the CPP/NPA, and the NCP-M; first, for the analysis of factors considered 
to be  prerequisites for success, and then specifically for the approach taken by the 
insurgencies: military only or a combination of political and military. The impact that the 
approach taken has on the outcome of the insurgency will be analyzed. The final chapter 
will conclude with observations and lessons for future counterinsurgency, conflict de-
escalation, and conflict termination.  
The thesis will highlight the impact of effectively employing or ignoring political 
negotiations as a genuine means for achieving political success for insurgent groups. In 
the twenty-first century, the execution of the military-only approach may not be 
successful. This was demonstrated by the fate of the Shining Path and the CPP/NPA. 
Persuading incumbent political forces to co-opt and accommodate their major political 
demands may be strategically more feasible and effective. I will demonstrate how the 
NCP-M, after creating conducive conditions by the use of traditional military strategies, 
was able to succeed in achieving its political objectives by retaining and exercising 
flexibility toward a negotiated political settlement that co-opted and accommodated its 
demands and led to its rise to power.  
 14
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II. THE SHINING PATH (SENDERO LUMINOSO) OF PERU 
A. INTRODUCTION  
The Shining Path or the “Sendero Luminoso” stands out as an exception to Che 
Guevara’s dictum that it is not advisable to start an insurgency against an elected 
government, for the masses will choose the electoral alternative. 38 The Shining Path 
waged an armed insurgency against a democratically elected government and, more 
interestingly, was able to rise very quickly through a combination of well-targeted 
framing of the grievances of the poverty-stricken Peruvian peasants and the coercive 
power of extremely violent armed action.  However, the Shining Path failed as quickly as 
it rose within about 10 years of the beginning of its campaign. Its failure is worthy of 
analysis because of the connection between its rigid adherence to Maoist ideals leading to 
a military dominant approach that inhibited its ability to exploit political opportunities 
and the outcome of the movement.  
In this chapter, I will show that the movement failed because its leaders refused to 
engage in pragmatic politics as well as the sort of violent struggle that Mao advocated. 
This is unlike the situation in Nepal, where the Maoists used a flexible strategy that I will 
explain in Chapter IV. The Shining Path leadership failed to exploit the political 
opportunities created by the success of its military strategy, which would have allowed it 
to establish an alternative state. The insurgency continued to rely upon a campaign of 
terrorist violence that threatened to bring down the Lima regime through military defeat 
instead of consolidating its political gains in a timely fashion. Because of this the 
movement collapsed once its leader was captured.  
Does this mean that Maoism has become ideologically bankrupt or Mao’s strategy 
of “people’s war” has become any less applicable or impracticable in the current 
conditions? Or is it simply that the true ideals of Maoism and Mao’s strategy were 
                                                 
38 Timothy P. Wickham-Crowley, Understanding Failed Revolution in El Salvador: A Comparative 
Analysis of Regime Types and Social Structures,” Politics and Society, 17:4, December 1989, 511–537 
quoted in Cynthia McClintok, “Theories of Revolution and the Case of Peru,” ed. David Scott Palmer, The 
Shining Path of Peru, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994) 242–254.  
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misunderstood or misinterpreted by its practitioners, and that this led them to adopt 
inflexible positions that ignored the domestic and international context? Or is it a case of 
an ideological dogma that drove the notion of making a “true Maoist revolution” as 
envisioned by its leader Guzman that ignored “politics” in pursuit of the “war”? 39   
In this chapter I will compare the Shining Path’s approach to some critical 
variables of insurgency that are considered to be the minimum prerequisites for the 
success of an insurgency. These variables include adherence to ideology, clarity of 
political objectives, leadership and organization, popular support, and external support. 
While analysis of the above-mentioned factors may provide a guide for understanding the 
Shining Path’s failure, they do not adequately explain the difference between its failure 
and NCP-M’s success. The major difference between the two becomes clear from the 
analysis of the overall approach taken by the two on conducting an insurgency. The 
assessment of leadership will focus on the inclination of the leadership toward a 
particular strategy and approach at various points in time and the level of flexibility 
demonstrated. Similarly, a study of ideology will help us understand the value attached to 
the military or political components and the position of negotiation, politics of alliance, 
and electoral participation in the overall insurgency scheme. A summary of the analysis 
will lead to the identification of the insurgent approach (military only or politico-military) 
to explain its impact on the final outcome. 
B. BACKGROUND  
The Shining Path was born in the impoverished highland area of Ayacucho, 
which has an estimated population of over half a million people.40 Guzman, a professor 
of philosophy, started the movement in the 1970s. Guzman’s political career started when 
he joined the Communist Party of Peru in 1964.  He left the party after the Sino-Soviet 
rift and adopted Maoist ideals.  The organization took about 10 long years of preparation 
under Guzman before it turned into a violent movement in 1980. It carried out various 
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91–110. 
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attacks during the presidential elections to make its mark on Peru’s political scene.41 The 
insurgency spread rapidly in the 1980s. Within a decade, it had not only caused $10 
billion in property damage and over 20,000 deaths, but it almost threatened to take over 
the government in Lima. 42  
Interestingly, the movement grew during an extended period of economic growth 
and government expansion, particularly in public education and rural development 
initiatives.43 By the late 1980s it had emerged as a very powerful insurgency that could 
topple the Lima regime. The Shining Path had already expanded throughout the country. 
Its organization was divided into seven regional committees, all with their own separate 
annihilation squads and popular committees of sympathizers. The movement had already 
established various liberated zones where their finance committees worked openly 
collecting “people’s taxes,” which was believed to be at least $10 million every year.44 
The level of Sendero’s presence across the country, combined with the ability of its 
guerillas to operate with relative freedom, the amount of funds it was able to raise, the 
level of social control it could exercise on the populace through coercion, and the 
growing strength of its political organization all indicated its capability to challenge the 
Peruvian state. 
In 1992, President Alberto Fujimori’s autogolpe (Self coup) against his own 
government presented the Shining Path with a political opportunity. With its nationwide 
presence, the finances it had secured, and its large infrastructure within the capitol, the 
Shining Path leadership became convinced that it was on the verge of triumph hence 
began to plan for the final offensive.45 They were to affect the collapse of the government 
through a campaign of “generalized violence, gradual encirclement of the cities and 
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establishment of the new democracy.”46 It planned to carry out multiple violent attacks in 
the month of October 1992 to “shake the country to its foundations” followed by a year-
long violent attack that would bring the government “to its knees” by the end of 1993 in 
order to commemorate the 100th anniversary of Mao’s birth.47 However, the plan could 
not be carried out because Guzman was captured by the specialized police intelligence 
unit (National Counterterrorism Agency) in September 1992. The Shining Path’s mistake 
was in not identifying the method it would use to capitalize on the opportunity presented 
by the unpopular coup. 
The arrest marked the beginning of a downhill trend for the Shining Path. 
Guzman’s arrest was followed by the subsequent capture of other main leaders and over 
3,500 members of the party over the next year. This   resulted in the dismantling of the 
insurgency infrastructure.48 The level of political violence also declined in 1993 by nine 
percent and more sharply in 1994.49 Guzman later appealed for peace negotiations with 
the government through a letter to President Alberto Fujimori indicating the level of 
decline the organization had suffered. Currently, the Shining Path still continues to 
operate in Peru but at a lesser scale and with limited impact on national security or 
politics. Although observers do not discount the possibility of a revival of the movement, 
the Shining Path has ceased to be a movement that could threaten the Peruvian state. 
C. GRIEVANCES THAT LED TO THE INSURGENCY 
The uniqueness of the Shining Path insurgency lies in the fact that it was able to 
exploit economic grievances as the major catalyst to incite the revolution. It is also true 
that without a strong organization with a firm ideological belief that could convince the 
population of economic and sociopolitical deliverance, economic grievances alone would 
not have been sufficient. Looking at the extremely difficult terrain and the level of abject 
poverty of the area, the insurgency by some is considered to be a “logical outgrowth of its 
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environment.”50 Similarly, the political repression that continued from the limited 
civilian democracy (1895–1919) throughout the military regimes (1968–1980) leading up 
to the Fujimori period also helped radicalize the masses.  
Although Cynthia McClintok agrees that “anger of repression or poverty is not a 
sufficient condition” of insurgency, there is no denying that economic conditions in rural 
Peru were still not satisfactory.51 There existed a general trend of rampant inflation, a 
decline in the production of goods and services, a loss of jobs, a decline in living 
standards, and a frustration among the rural and poor populace that created a much-
needed setting for the insurgency. She argues that the ability of the Shining Path, as an 
efficient insurgent organization, to channel this economic crisis led to the growth of 
insurgency.52 Marks counter argues that neither Peru’s economic or political conditions 
were such that they would provoke an insurgency.53 According to him, the economy was 
recovering, a democratic government had returned after a long military rule, and an 
extensive agrarian reform was being carried out with the help of the Soviet Union.54 
However, while the government was trying to improve economic conditions, it is difficult 
to assess whether they were having any significant impact.55 
Ton de Wit and Vera Gianotten believe that the “cultural dislocation” followed by 
the displacement of various native ethnic groups by other ethnic groups during the 
expansion of the Inca empire resulted in a “cultural trauma” and continued conflict 
between the communities.56 This situation also assisted in creating an environment that 
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was conducive for the growth of the insurgency. Another dimension is presented by the 
huge gap between the urban and the rural. This is characterized by an acute neglect of the 
outlying areas and the rural peasant population combined with the government’s often 
“indiscriminate and excessive military response.” This situation antagonized the 
population, a sentiment that was exploited by the Shining Path for further radicalization 
of the masses and recruitment. The Shining Path successfully framed these grievances in 
a Maoist ideological framework and continued to mobilize. 
D. IDEOLOGY AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES 
Ideology is considered to be the primary driver of a revolutionary social 
movement, and it derives force from its utility for mass mobilization. The Shining Path 
preached the purest form of Maoism because Guzman believed that true Maoism held the 
key to the revolution. He said “to be Marxist today, to be communists, necessarily 
demands that we be Marxists-Leninists-Maoists and principally Maoists. Otherwise we 
could not be genuine Maoists.” Similarly, he believed that Maoist ideology is the only 
one capable of transforming the world and must be adhered to for the revolution.57 His 
strong belief in Maoist doctrine guided the party’s strategy toward adoption of a rigid line 
of action. 
But, on the other hand, he also emphasized the need to apply the universal truths 
of Marxism-Leninism-Maoism to the concrete conditions of Peru, which indicated that he 
was not completely averse to the idea that the practice of Maoism could differ 
contextually. In contrast to what Guzman said, in reality the Shining Path practiced 
Mao’s people’s war to the extent of fanaticism. Gustavo Garriti summarizes the nature of 
the Shining Path by saying that “it wages its revolutionary war according to Mao’s 
people’s war doctrine, preserves its orthodox course through regular purging rituals and  
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maintains unity through a personality cult of gigantic proportions.”58 This confirms the 
inflexible approach adopted by the insurgency in regards to the application of Maoism or 
the people’s war strategy on the ground. 
Chernick argues that the Shining Path adopted a “fundamentalist Marxist 
historical materialism that consisted of a closed diagnosis and circular analysis with little 
disposition for debate, with a vision that was inconsistent with reality but that was 
expressed as being based on scientific and universal truths.” 59 The insurgency operated 
along Lenin’s vanguard principle and used violence as the primary instrument for 
achieving political power. The rigidity of the Shining path’s ideology benefitted the 
insurgency in the beginning as it gathered credence among the population that was wary 
of the corrupt leaders from the conventional left. But the same ideological rigidity later 
became an obstacle to the process of making rational political decisions or strategic 
decisions. 
The Shining Path considered all other left-wing movements to be revisionary. 
Guzman abhorred the other communist and socialist parties and believed that they were 
trying to substitute Marxism with bourgeoisie philosophy. He considered combating 
revisionism more important than fighting imperialism. He opposed even the “Soviet 
socialist imperialism of Gorbachev” and “China’s revisionism of Deng.”60 He thus 
considered the Shining Path to be the “fourth sword of Marxism” and advocated 
complete social change through violence.  
The amount of emphasis given to violence by the insurgency led critics to 
conclude that “Sendero has an ideology, to destroy society in order to build a new 
society, they don’t want to modify. It is easier to build anew than to change the existing 
thing.”61 This might be the reason why despite being a Maoist insurgency, it is also 
considered a terrorist organization. Gordon H. McCormick and some others argue that 
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among others, it is “by far the largest and most successful of Peru’s terrorist 
organizations and it reveals a number of organizational and ideological features that are 
quite unique.” 62 He identifies three distinct characteristics about the Shining Path. First, 
the unique ideological combination of Andean mysticism, Maoism, and the world view of 
its leader Guzman, second, it’s unmatched “fanaticism and extreme parochialism,” and 
last, simple ruthlessness.63  
Radical adoption of Maoist ideology in its purest form and rejection of other 
socialist parties as revisionist left the Shining Path with little possibility of adopting a 
political approach. Similarly, the influence of violent Leninist methods in its strategy and 
a cult-like organizational hierarchy made the party take up the modus operandi of a 
terrorist-like organization rather than an insurgent organization pursuing tangible political 
objectives. Such dogmatic views on ideology, scorn for other communists, and an 
emphasis on violence possibly explains the inherently inflexible nature of the Shining 
Path. This helps explain its negative approach toward legitimate political opportunities. 
The Shining Path rarely issued communiqués and press statements about its 
demands, goals, and objectives. Only two texts describing its objectives and a rare 
interview by Guzman himself in September 1986 exist.64  The Shining Path’s stated goal 
was the creation of a “new state of workers and peasants” or the “new democracy.”65 It 
drew heavily from the work of Jose Carlos Mariategui, who believed that the original 
basis of Peruvian socialism lay in the pre-Columbian peasant community or the idea of 
native, agrarian communism.66  Guzman himself indicated that the goal of the insurgency 
was to mount a general uprising that would in turn bring about the collapse of urban 
society and destroy the government in Lima. 67 There were, however, no details on what 
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should replace the old structure. It only stated that the national market economy, the 
banking system, industry, and all foreign trade should be abolished and a communal, 
village-oriented economy based upon the barter system should be established.68 It was 
difficult to comprehend how to implement such economic measures even if the 
movement succeeded in coming to power. 
While the operations carried out by the Shining Path were largely confined to 
Peru, it also had some international goals. According to Guzman, the scope of the 
insurgency would expand to encompass other nations of Latin America in the future as 
well. Thus it can be said that its goal was not only to overthrow the regime in Peru but 
also to create the beginnings of a Latin American revolution for a new socialist system. 
With the limited texts and references outlining its objectives, it is clear that the 
Shining Path, like some other Maoist insurgencies, wanted to capture state power in order 
to establish the “dictatorship of the proletariat,” but it is difficult to make out what 
alternative structures and institutions it wanted to establish. This ambiguity in political 
and institutional objectives remained one of the problematic aspects of the insurgency. 
The insurgency clearly lacked clarity in its political objectives. The Shining Path never 
clearly articulated its’ political objectives in the form of structures and institutions that 
would replace the old ones. 
Additionally, the declared goals of the Shining Path can best be described as 
vague and utopian. Had it identified its objectives clearly in terms of the desired 
institutional, political, social, and economic changes, it would have been possible for the 
movement to combine political and military strategies. The dogmatic execution of 
people’s war, the vague nature of the political goals, the use of extreme violence, and the 
isolationist policy of the Shining Path made political negotiation, alliance formation, and 
the creation of a united front extremely difficult. Under these conditions, the movement 
faced two outcomes: either win militarily or perish.  
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E. POPULAR SUPPORT 
Many analysts believe that the movement failed because, at the latter stage, it lost 
the support of the same social base that helped its rise. Chernic argues that while the 
populace supported the Shining Path’s actions against village enemies and corrupt 
officials, they were not prepared for a broader war that would create a new social order 
and new state that was yet to be identified.69 Thomas Marks also observes that “(the 
Shining Path) appears to have mobilized apparent (popular) support, yet it engages in 
practices which would seemingly alienate potential followers.”70 This is indicative of the 
level of violence that the Shining Path carried out not only against government forces and 
structures but against innocent civilians. 
The key puzzle to the analysts at the time was how an insurgency that was so 
brutal and violent, even against civilians, could command considerable popular support. 
During the early 1980s the key question was how the Shining Path was able to expand its 
influence despite its dogmatism and brutal tactics.71 It was a known fact that the 
movement used extreme violence to maintain its grip on the populace (and probably was 
aware of the negative consequences) but chose to ignore it deliberately because it 
believed that it could push for the final decision through military means and did not need 
to court the people anymore. The neglect of popular support at the latter stage may have 
stemmed from the traditional communist mistrust in the common people to rise 
spontaneously for revolution. As Chernick argues, “Sendero Luminoso represented a 
pedagogical project … its assertion of authority based on Leninist style (vanguardist, 
democratically centralized and distrustful of the masses) pedagogy of revolution.” 72  
The role played by local resistance groups or “self-defense groups” is also given 
considerable credit for the failure of the Shining Path, but it is more of an extreme 
manifestation of loss of popular support that was mobilized against the movement in an 
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organized manner rather than anything else.73 The spontaneous local resistance to the 
Shining Path’s brutality was an ominous sign for the movement’s sustainability. Hazleton 
remarked that “Sendero will not necessarily triumph but on the contrary the anti-popular 
violence that it has injected into the system may prove to be self-destructive.”74 The level 
of violence perpetrated by the Shining Path was excessive. An estimate puts the number 
of displaced civilians at around 200,000, which left many mountain villages as ghost 
villages.75 Also, more than 30,000 people (many of them civilians) were killed, a figure 
that is more than double what the Maoist insurgency in Nepal claimed in the same 
number of years.76 Insurgencies strive to maintain a balance between coercion and 
persuasion, however, the Shining Path preferred coercion alone. As the end showed, the 
Shining Path failed partly due to its self-destructive, coercive schemes for gaining and 
maintaining popular support and partly because of the dramatic collapse its 
organizational structure suffered at the hands of a compromised leadership. 
F. LEADERSHIP AND ORGANIZATION 
Leadership is crucial to the outcome of an insurgency since it has a primary 
responsibility in determining the approach of an insurgency. The leaders need to make 
critical decisions about issues such as the redefining of goals and the revision of 
ideologies and strategies in order to exploit political opportunities to further the insurgent 
objectives. Besides charisma, an insurgent leadership requires the ability to identify 
opportunity and craft an approach with pragmatism and flexibility in order to achieve 
success. Guzman’s leadership, in contrast, was not only dictatorial and centralized but 
also dogmatic, which prevented any possibility for seizing political opportunities. 
Guzman, a professor of philosophy, left the Peruvian Communist Party after the 
Sino-Soviet rift to establish the Shining Path. He was very idealistic and accused other 
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communists of “betraying their Maoist origins by promoting the ‘privilege’ of the cities 
and having ‘scorn for the countryside,’” and he decided to continue his efforts to lead a 
rural-based revolt against the Lima regime.77 He used his position in the University to 
recruit an ideologically-inclined faculty and members for the organization.  
Guzman’s leadership appeared to be unquestioned and the organization drew from 
his utopian vision. The authority for deciding on strategy resided in the hands of Guzman 
alone.78 The regional commanders only played a coordinating role as far as 
organizational strategy was concerned, and they were reduced to the role of passing 
orders and instructions down the chain to local levels. Guzman, under the nom de guerre 
of Comrade Gonjalo, carefully created an image of genius and omnipresence among his 
followers and remained a force behind the organization.79 His influence inside the 
organization was such that observers concluded that “he had shaped Sendero into his own 
image, determining the agenda, direction and ideological orientation.  Isolated and aloof 
he exercised a strong hold over the movement’s leadership and rank and file alike.”80 He 
presented himself in an almost religious manner among the highland peasantry that was 
designed to appeal to local superstitions and customs. 
According to Ann Ruth Wilner, four key attributes of a charismatic leadership 
apply here. The relationship between Guzman and the Shining Path can be considered a 
clear case of the charismatic leader-follower relationship that is based upon these four 
characteristics. First, the group leader is believed to possess a unique vision and 
superhuman qualities. Second, group followers unquestioningly accept the leader’s 
views, statements, and judgments. Third, they comply with his orders and directives 
without condition. Last, they give the leader unqualified support and devotion.81 In this 
situation he commands absolute authority.  
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The almost god-like image of Guzman and his unquestioned authority within the 
organization proved to be a weakness and a major liability for two reasons. First, it 
undermined the ability of the organization to operate and survive in the absence of its 
leader. Second, it limited the organization’s ability to make rational decisions based upon 
an assessment of prevailing situations. The second characteristic is more important 
because the organization, although successful in establishing and consolidating its gains, 
could not convert it into the ultimate objective of grabbing the state power. The lack of 
strategic flexibility in exercising different political options could not be considered. 
Additionally, the extremely militaristic approach taken by the leadership left little room 
for debate about the appropriateness of the approach within the party. This centralized 
and personalized form of organization and leadership proved to be a major weakness, 
which became evident after the capitulation of the movement once Guzman was 
captured.82  
G. EXTERNAL AND FINANCIAL SUPPORT 
Insurgencies can develop with or without external support or sponsorship, but for 
the sustainment or success of the insurgency, external support can be critical because it 
can bridge the disparity of resources between the government and the insurgency. 
However, the Shining Path did not have such support. The Shining Path remained aloof 
and insulated from other left-wing revolutionary movements and possible sources of 
external support.83 On the domestic front, it refused to make an alliance with the legal 
left, and externally, it deliberately avoided contact with other socialist and communist 
governments. The Shining Path called them revisionists, thus it developed as an 
indigenous movement without the support of the Soviets or the Chinese.84 This factor 
worked both as strength and a weakness of the insurgency. This factor was a strength in 
the sense that due to the Shining Path’s indigenous nature it was able to command the 
allegiance of the people and stood on a higher morale plain. It was also a weakness 
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because it severely restricted its ability to exploit political openings created by external 
concerns in order to achieve its own goals. The utility of external involvement becomes 
clear in Chapter IV where I will explain how the NCP-M successfully exploited the 
concerns of the Indian government and enlisted their intervention in favor of the NCP-M 
against the Nepalese monarchy.85  
The Shining Path’s primary means of financial support came from the Indian 
communities of the Altiplano. While early contributions were voluntary, the contributions 
evolved into a taxation or extortion. Additional support was gathered through bank 
robberies and expropriations from local landowners, petty capitalists, and elements of the 
peasantry considered hostile to the Shining Path cause.86 The drug trade was also an 
important source of funds. The local drug dealers bought protection from the Shining 
Path and were able to divert the attention of law enforcement agencies. This provides an 
example of the natural alliance between an insurgent movement and criminals. First, 
insurgencies are open to the idea of recruiting individuals from criminal groups because 
they are already skilled in arms, and in turn, the criminals are also responsive because 
they gain protection by being a part of the movement. Similarities are found in this regard 
between the Shining Path and the NCP-M, which provided protection to the sandalwood 
smugglers in Nepal.87 
H. ANALYSIS OF THE OVERALL APPROACH 
Analysis of some key variables as prerequisites for insurgent success suggests that 
the Shining Path stands out as an insurgency because it advocated the purest form of 
Maoism and executed its people’s war strategy through a ruthless militaristic strategy of 
terror and guerilla warfare. Although political strategies were also applied by the 
insurgency at the local level, its application overall was not balanced with its military 
element. This remains the primary reason for the Shining Path’s failure, because, while it 
chose to ignore political approaches, it lacked the military might it needed to be capable 
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of delivering a decisive blow to the Peruvian state. This paradoxical relationship between 
its approach and capabilities in relation to its objectives possibly explains its failure. 
Guzman believed and openly professed that armed struggle is the only means of 
achieving victory, and he wanted political violence to play a fundamental role in the 
revolutionary process in transforming the semi-feudal nature of Peruvian society.88 
Hence, he considered popular war to be the principle form of struggle. However, for the 
popular war to culminate in seizure of political power, the people’s army needed to be 
able to defeat the state military. The Shining Path, although capable of parading with 
arms in broad daylight in Lima, was in reality unable to confront the Peruvian state 
directly. Hence, it executed a concerted campaign of terror against the symbols of Lima’s 
authority, the economy, and foreign supporters.89  
The Shining Path’s terror strategy compensated for the lack of conventional 
capability. It was used as an instrument to enforce revolutionary order in areas that were 
in contestation with the state or areas that had fallen under guerilla control. Since the 
Shining Path abhorred cooperation with other political forces and called them 
revisionists, violence remained the only means for waging and winning the revolution. 
That is why it preached militarism. Glowing references to bravery in revolutionary war 
appeared throughout the Shining Path’s tracts and advocated violence and violence 
alone.90   
McCormick describes the Shining Path’s use of terrorism for advancing its 
purported goals. The Shining Path carried out “people’s trials” to punish landowners, 
corrupt officials, and local businessmen. Annihilation of class enemies featured 
prominently in Sendero’s tactics. These were carried out as coordinated acts of 
assassination and the posting of death threats to disrupt and paralyze local institutions. 
The targets also sometimes included political institutions, labor and peasant 
organizations, and even the police.  Sendero would declare a place to be a “Zone of 
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liberation.” Once that was done they would round up large number of local 
administrators, community leaders, and other “traitors,” and, after a brief “people’s trial” 
they would be shot, hung, mutilated, or beaten for their crimes against the revolution.91 
This obvious ideological inclination toward violence and clear manifestation of violent 
methods in implementing its strategies and tactics prevented the organization from 
exploiting any political opportunity and led ultimately to its failure. 
In the quest to preserve its so called political purity, the Shining Path rejected any 
alliance with the “legal left” or the Marxist left and other guerilla groups in Peru. By 
rejecting these alliances, it lost the opportunity to create a united front with other political 
forces and bring a full force against the Lima regime. While the military dictatorship 
went on in Peru, the democratic left grouped as the Izquierda Unida (IU) and sought to 
build a participatory democracy. It was especially active in Villa El Salvador. Rather than 
joining hands with the IU and broadening its political alliance in order to attack Lima, the 
Shining Path termed them revisionists and tried to destroy them. The persistent attacks of 
the Shining Path against the leaders and supporters of the IU antagonized the civil 
organizations and individuals who supported the IU.92 This act of alienation became 
counterproductive as popular support slowly diminished and the counterinsurgency 
abilities of the government strengthened. 
Hostility against the legal left impacted the Shining Path in two ways. It opened 
two fronts for contestation of political authority. The Shining Path fought not only the 
state for political authority but also the well-established left parties that required extra 
resources. Due to this, the Shining Path was unable to infiltrate the labor unions. 
Although the two main labor unions of Peru, the General Confederation of Workers of 
Peru (CGTP) and the Teachers labor union (SUTEP), were drawn to radicalism, they 
were opposed to terrorism.93 This also supports the notion that the overtly militaristic 
approach of the Shining Path prevented it from making useful allies. According to Marks, 
                                                 
91 McCormick, “The Shining Path and Peruvian Terrorism,” 118.  
92 Burt, Political Violence and the Authoritarian State in Peru: Silencing Civil Society, 10.  
93 Gabriela Tarazona-Sevillano, “The Organization of Shining Path,” in The Shining Path of Peru, ed. 
David Scott Palmer 202–203 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994). 
 31
it is puzzling as to why the Shining Path, which claimed Maoist inspiration, rejected the 
necessity for a united front strategy that was so much advocated by Mao himself and 
instead adopted a dogmatic concept of self reliance.94 Their vision of reproducing Mao’s 
“people’s war” in its purest form may not have been an accurate one and possibly denied 
the Shining Path one of the most influential means of broadening its support base. This 
kept it from having the political influence that it needed to deliver a fatal blow to the 
Lima regime. 
Although the party’s very first plenary session in September 1987 endorsed a 
strategic shift from protracted rural warfare to an accelerated, urban-based revolution, it 
remained purely a military shift.95 No initiatives were taken either toward consolidation 
of the political front or to begin negotiation with the government once the focus shifted to 
cities. Even when the organization reached a stage whereby its activists and sympathizers 
were able to march through central Lima waving banners and throwing bombs, called 
“the march without fear” in May 1988, it still didn’t show any interest in negotiation or 
forming political alliances. In fact, in Guzman’s famous 1988 interview, he ruled out any 
cooperation with the “reactionary” politicians of the IU  and charged that the existing 
popular organizations were “obstacles to the revolution” and directed Sendero’s attacks 
towards them as well.96 
The Shining Path also did not believe in participating in elections. Guzman 
dismissed legislative activities and elections and questioned their ability to deliver. He 
said “looking at Peru’s experience, what revolutionary transformation has the people 
achieved through voting, or in parliamentary activity?”97  In fact, the Shining Path began 
their armed movement by burning a ballot box in May 1980 on the eve of Peru’s first 
national election. But, contrary to the liking of the Shining Path, Peru recorded better 
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national turnout for elections.98 This possibly signaled the power of electoral politics and 
the Shining Path’s coming failure, because people had shown faith in the process.99  
Rejection of all other forms of contestation with the state besides the military option was 
the hallmark of the Shining Path and probably the reason for its failure. 
It would, however, be wrong to say that the Shining Path insurgency did not 
involve politics in its operation. Some consider the strategy of the Shining Path to be 
comprehensive and claim that it did have political strategies that were aimed at “gaining 
local support, neutralizing opponents, and advancing its revolutionary cause … The 
examples of its political strategies are the construction of local forms of governance, the 
provision of local security, vigilante justice, punishment of corruption … pursued by the 
Shining Path to build support in the local community.”100 It definitely attempted to create 
and occupy the political space in the Peruvian landscape. The Shining Path successfully 
created its ideological base among the university students who became the flag bearers 
and preachers of its ideology. Similarly, it exploited the Indian ethnic groups of the 
Ayachucho districts and their grievances for recruitment and mobilization purposes. 
Furthermore, the Shining Path created sympathy among the general populace by standing 
out from the corrupt and inept politicians and Peruvian politics. He further argues that 
these political strategies accompanied the use of terrorist violence against civilian targets. 
However, the Nepal case illustrates that a balance between the two is critical for 
success. The Shining Path did not demonstrate such a balance between the military and 
political approaches. The brutality and extent of the Shining Path’s violence has often 
obscured the political strategies the group pursued.101  Its attraction to violence and 
relative political isolation might have given it the initial advantage in terms of credibility 
and popular support, but once it began to rely too much on violence the support swung  
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the other way. The Shining Path’s belief that it could march to the seat of power with 
military might and without political maneuvering of some sort led to its ultimate 
downfall.  
I. CONCLUSIONS 
The Shining Path’s refusal to make the critical decision to adopt a political 
alternative in place of a continued overtly-militaristic and terrorist-like approach in order 
to reach its objective led to its failure. The balance between persuasion and coercion is 
the key for insurgents anywhere. As long as the movement continued using violence only 
as a tool in support of the functioning and expansion of its political structure and not as 
an end unto itself, the movement could remain viable.102 The Shining Path couldn’t 
maintain the balance or chose to consolidate its political gains resulting in the loss of 
popular support. The Shining Path used the Maoist approach…in a purposeful effort to 
force a solution for society’s ills upon a populace not ready to accept its answer.103  
Marks further comments that in the pursuit of ideological purity, Maoist 
insurgencies become increasingly divorced from the masses they purport to serve. The 
militaristic components, those associated with “people’s war,” have come to overshadow 
those embodied in the “united front” and the “mass line.” Marks noticed that while 
attempting to pass judgment upon their approaches, one cannot allow their opportunism 
to pass automatically for ideological content. There is, however, a clear case for military 
domination over political consideration in the approaches motivated by ideology.104 This 
observation is very important, and its impact on the outcome of an insurgency is 
profound for various reasons. 
First, the Shining Path’s  rejection of conventional political methods to augment 
the political position it gained through local political strategies (such as parallel 
government, an alternative judicial system, and other similar programs that could help 
win popular support) did not help the organization to consolidate its authority. By using 
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extreme violence against the civilian populace its local political structures became 
unpopular and met with local resistance at later stages. Thus we see a gradual decay in 
the popular support enjoyed by it in the beginning. This culminated in outright resistance 
by the population.  
Second, its outright rejection of external socialist / communist solidarity was 
against Mao’s principles and cost the Shining Path in terms of the international 
legitimacy that it needed to establish itself as a revolutionary group and not as a terrorist 
organization. Similarly, its rejection of the legal left and any possibility of an alliance 
with them also went against Mao’s united front strategy and left the Shining Path on its 
own. The clear contradiction that the Shining Path demonstrated with Maoism was partly 
a result of an improper interpretation of the united front framework.  Marks thus argues 
that what the Shining Path was doing was not really Maoism since they were more 
dogmatic concerning self-reliance than Mao appears to advocate. 
The analysis of Palmer and Marks brings to the fore the predominantly military 
approach of the Peruvian insurgency. McCormick has termed the Shining Path a terrorist 
organization and argued that its “isolation and extremism” were its main weaknesses. 
From the very beginning, the Shining Path denounced the political approach by rejecting 
any form of association with the legal left. Similarly, its uncompromisingly rigid 
ideological belief also became a liability that was in fact contrary to Mao’s idea of 
creating as wide an opposition base as possible against the state.105 Furthermore, the 
Shining Path’s indiscriminate use of terror also contributed to its loss of popular support.  
This overtly militant approach possibly stems from the “frustration of its leader 
Guzman about the corruption of Marxist ideology and prevalence of revisionism in 
Peruvian left politics that drove him to lead a revolution that is ideologically pure.”106 
The unquestioned nature of Guzman’s authority within the party also ensured that the 
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most radical line would prevail within the party, and that its fundamental principle would 
revolve around the thoughts of Marx, Lenin, Mao, and Comrade Gonjalo.107  
Although the Shining Path is still operating in Peru, its political base is weak and 
military capability is insignificant. The movement that was once on the verge of 
capturing the state is no longer a serious threat to the Peruvian state but is reduced to a 
law and order problem. To conclude, the failure of the Shining Path can be summarized 
as a combined result of its ideological dogma, rigidity of leadership, preference for 
violence, domestic and international isolationism, reliance on coercive means for popular 
support, and rejection of negotiation and electoral politics. All factors combined, it shows 
that the military-dominant approach taken by the insurgency (at the cost of a politico-
military balanced approach) is the primary reason for its failure.  
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III. THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE PHILIPPINES 
(CPP/NPA) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The CPP/NPA is another case of a Maoist insurgency that failed to achieve its 
final political objective despite making significant revolutionary advances. It seemed to 
have all the ingredients that lead an insurgency to success. The movement was successful 
in framing the grievances existing in Philippine society and was able to incite an armed 
insurgency through sound political organization and social mobilization. The movement 
waged a war against a dictatorship, had considerable popular and external support, 
boasted a strong armed wing, even practiced relatively flexible strategies of united front, 
had alliances of convenience, and engaged in negotiation yet still failed.  
Since its beginning in 1968, the movement grew so rapidly that it appeared on the 
verge of capturing the state power in the mid-1980s, and it contributed to the fall of 
Ferdinand Marcos in 1986. But in the years following Marcos’s fall, the movement 
gradually declined. Many leaders of the movement were captured, its armed wing was 
depleted, and it lost its mass base in many areas. Although the insurgency still persists in 
the Philippines and retains some appeal, it is no longer a threat to the democratic 
Philippine state. What, then, led to its failure?  
In this chapter, I show that the CPP/NPA failed in the period after 1986 because 
of its inability to recognize the changes in the environment. I present a case to show that 
despite a dramatic change in the political mood of the population, a shift in international 
dynamics, reduced utility of armed movement, and availability of political opportunity, 
the movement still chose to continue armed struggle along the dogmatic lines of Maoist 
ideology. Interestingly, it gave up the very elements of flexibility and pragmatism that 
allowed it to grow in the early period. Its failure to participate in electoral politics was the 
main cause of its failure.  
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This chapter will assess the CPP/NPA’s approach toward insurgency through the 
use of similar variables as were applied to the Shining Path with an aim to identifying a 
relationship between an insurgent approach and the final outcome. 
B. BACKGROUND 
The Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) was formed in 1968. Like other 
radical communist movements around the world, the CPP was also a breakaway faction 
of the original Communist Party in the Philippines, the PKP (Partido Komunista ng 
Philipnas or Philippine Communist Party). Disappointed by the party’s performance, 
“Jose Maria Sison, a university lecturer, organized the CPP almost entirely on Mao’s 
doctrine of peasant-based mass revolution.” 108 With Marxism and Maoism as its 
ideological base, the CPP spread the revolution by exploiting Philippine nationalism, 
peasant unrest, and growing political activism against a corrupt and weak state led by 
Marcos.  
Sison established the New People’s Army (NPA) as the guerilla arm of the party 
in 1969. The NPA grew in strength and capability and threatened the Philippine Armed 
Forces considerably. It expanded tremendously in the years between 1970 and 1980 and 
was noted as a formidable political and military force that was capable of capturing state 
power in the Philippines. Although the actual numbers for the NPA were debated, there is 
little doubt that it was a capable military force. CPP’s mouthpiece paper, Ang Bayan, 
reported in December 1984 that over 30,000 Filipinos were members of the party, and the 
NPA had over 20,000 troops.109  
The CPP also established the National Democratic Front (NDF) in 1971 with the 
objective of garnering the “widest political, diplomatic, and financial support for the 
revolution.”110 It incorporated many other underground organizations including the 
influential Christians for National Liberation (CNL). The NDF still serves as the 
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backbone of both the underground revolutionary structure and the overt political 
movement.111 But the relationship between the CPP and NDF appears entangled in a 
debate as to whether the NDF should serve the CPP or operate with relative autonomy. 
This exposes a certain tension about whether the open or underground organization 
should be most important.112 
In terms of influence, Van Der Kroef estimated that by 1988 the CPP/NPA held 
20 percent of the operational control over the Barangays and exercised some degree of 
influence in all 73 provinces.113 He also believed that the NPA was on the verge of 
“entering the threshold of the strategic stalemate” with the government.114 With its 
popularity soaring and increased military capability, a communist takeover of the 
Philippines seemed inevitable.  
The political setting, however, changed very quickly when Corazon Aquino took 
over the office of the president after Marcos was ousted from power in 1986. The 
presidential elections preceding Marcos’s ousting were boycotted by the CPP/NPA. By 
this time, although the NPA was still carrying out operations, the CPP was losing its 
appeal and popular support. Marks observed “the CPP is in a state of complete disarray 
and wracked by internal factionalism amounting to a virtual schism between elements 
favoring opposing strategic approaches to the conflict. Consequently, increasing numbers 
of the cadres decided to call it quits.”115 The insurgency slowly faltered and Marks 
concluded that “while the CPP bid for power has not ended, strategically the conflict is 
now only the government’s to lose.” 116 Other alternative explanations for the decline of 
the insurgency also exist, such as reforms carried out by the government, effective 
counterinsurgency operations by the armed forces, and loss of popular support owing to 
violence by the NPA. But the decline was primarily an outcome of the faulty strategic 
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approach taken by the party that neither took into account the realities surrounding the 
Philippines nor was able to recognize political opportunities.  
Despite the fact that the insurgency is still going on after 40 years, it is unable to 
convert its achievements into political victory. It is probably the longest-running 
communist insurgency in the world besides the Naxals in India who have been fighting 
since the 1950s. It may still make a comeback, since the current Philippine state is mired 
in “so much political corruption, fraud and violence that many Filipinos have become 
cynical about the country’s political system.”117 Although Nathan Gilbert Quimpo rules 
out a revival of “naked authoritarian rule” or a communist takeover, he remains 
concerned that prospects for a democratic consolidation are bleak.118 The insurgency 
survives mainly because there is a growing number of Filipinos who are frustrated at the 
weak Philippine state that is unable to address the socioeconomic grievances of the 
peasants. 
While I provide an analysis of the reasons for the insurgency’s failure and the link 
with its militaristic approach, it is important to analyze the nature of the grievances that 
were framed by the movement and the resources it employed. The resources it employed 
included ideology, leadership, popular support, and finances. Similarly, it is also useful to 
assess how it perceived political opportunities such as negotiations or participation in 
elections. This will help in answering the questions of why it decided for or against 
particular approaches and therefore shaped the outcome. 
C. GRIEVANCES LEADING TO THE INSURGENCY 
The insurgency in the Philippines is a product of rural as well as urban 
grievances. Because of the domestic dynamics of the Philippines in the late 1970s, the 
Philippines could be considered to be ripe for a revolution. While the rural poor were 
suffering from social exploitation, lack of land reform, and destitution, the urban 
population was seeking democratic freedom, fundamental rights, and good governance. 
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The civil liberty and international solidarity movements that surged throughout the world 
during the 1970s also energized younger people to organize and rally behind 
revolutionary movements. Nationalist sentiments against U.S. occupation also played a 
key role in allowing the CPP/NPA to efficiently exploit the existing conditions to create 
an insurgency.  
The rural poor were “desperate and outraged” by the increasing poverty, 
repression, and lack of institutional means to seek redress for their grievances.119 Their 
grievances were primarily related to the land and the system of its ownership and the 
subsequent exploitation by the rich. Land reform in an agrarian society is a crucial part of 
the socioeconomic transformation and can be a major source of contention. In the 
Philippines, the peasants became ever more disgruntled by the insensitivities 
demonstrated by the Marcos regime combined with the exploitation by local government 
administrators and the atrocities perpetrated by the local governments.120  
Similarly, the world youth movement of the late 1960s also influenced the 
Filipinos. Many youths, workers, and intellectuals radicalized in the protest movements 
of the 1960s and 1970s. Lack of political liberty and justice produced insurgent 
organizations. Additionally, the bad practices and undemocratic methods of the 
government and the high level of corruption in the Marcos regime were a source of 
discontent among both the rural and urban population. The element of military repression 
and widespread human rights abuse also worked in the favor of the insurgency.  For the 
years between 1975 and 1988, one source puts the number of disappeared people at 902 
and the number of extrajudicial killings at 2,983.121 
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The U.S. presence in the Philippines and its interference in the country’s political 
and economic affairs (even post-independence) helped to sustain an intelligentsia-backed 
nationalist and anti-U.S. discourse.122 This remained a primary source of motivation for 
the revolutionary movement until the U.S. bases were removed from the Philippines. 
Although both the democratic parties and socialist parties were protesting about the same 
issues, it was the revolutionary left led by the CPP/NPA that was able to capture the 
imagination of the people. 
D. IDEOLOGY  
The CPP’s ideology was primarily Marxist and Maoist in orientation, but it also 
had a Leninist aspect to it. The CPP/NPA’s ideology and political objectives are reflected 
in such founding papers as “the CPP’s Constitution,” “Rectify Errors and Rebuild the 
Party,” “Program for People’s Democratic Revolution,” and the “Main Tasks of the 
Party.” It borrowed the idea of building a “national democracy” from Mao’s ‘new 
democracy” concept and at the same time advocated a form of democratic socialism. 123 
The writings of its leader, Jose Mario Sison, under the name of Amado Guerrero, further 
shaped its ideology and strategy to a large extent. His writings urged the party to “rectify” 
the mistakes made by the PKP, among which “dogmatism” or the “rigid application of 
communist doctrine” was one of the biggest mistakes.124 It also cautioned against a 
“tendency to separate political practice from theoretical guidance.”125  
Kessler notes that Sison proposed creating a “broad national alliance” of all 
classes based upon the idea that the Philippines represented a semi-feudal society under 
neo-colonial rule. Thus he felt it was important to “wage a national democratic revolution 
of the new type … before the ’proletarian-socialist revolution’ could be made.”126 This 
clearly emphasized the need for political efforts to be carried out alongside military  
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actions. These activities would include building coalitions, establishing fronts, and 
organizing the peasants as the party’s power base that was to become a “key to the CPP’s 
success over the next decade.”127  
Furthermore, the party’s “ten point program” also pronounced that “there should 
be no monopoly of power by any class, party, or group. The degree of participation in the 
government by any political force should be based on its … role in the revolution.”128 
Many considered this to be a clear indication that the CPP/NPA was willing to accept a 
postcapitalist coalition along the lines of democratic socialism. Marks, on the other hand, 
makes a counterargument that it was not that the CPP/NPA was according priority to a 
united front over armed struggle, but that they were simply practicing Maoism because a 
united front is not a departure from Maoist strategy but an essential tenet of it.129 Either 
way, it reflects an ideological train of thought that is Maoist in orientation and at the 
same time takes into account the important role of various political forces in making the 
revolution. 
Unlike the Shining Path that, for reasons of “purity” avoided any possibility of 
political alliance with the legal left or formation of a united front, the CPP/NPA realized 
that political alliances were important and a united front strategy should be one of the key 
components of the insurgency. It is argued that the CPP/NPA neither emphasized nor 
exercised ideological dogmatism. Sison in particular emphasized empiricism and not 
ideology and the ideologues within the party were attacked for their failure to adopt 
pragmatic tactics suitable to practical applications.130 This made the CPP/NPA different 
in ideological flexibility in comparison to the dogmatism adopted by the Shining Path 
that saw all other political forces as not only revisionist but as the enemies of revolution. 
In this way, a striking similarity existed between the approach taken by the NCP-M and  
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the CPP/NPA. The Nepalese Maoists also gave up the dogmatic Maoist approach during 
their “Chunwang (a village in the Rolpa district of Western Nepal) conference” for a 
more pragmatic and flexible approach. 
After performing a geopolitical analysis, Sison adopted Mao’s vision of the 
classic protracted people’s war going through the phases of “Strategic Defensive,” 
“Strategic Stalemate,” and “Strategic Offensive.” 131 Although the armed wing of the 
party, the NPA, continued its operations against the Philippine Armed Forces, the 
CPP/NPA learned quickly about its own military weaknesses and adapted to the reality. 
Kessler praises the ability of the CPP/NPA to adapt saying that the “party’s flexibility in 
this respect was impressive.”132 The CPP/NPA was not averse to internal debate and was 
prompt in making regular changes in military strategy according to the situation. The 
CPP/NPA was characterized by a change in command structure and adaptation of 
adecentralized “archipelagic struggle” in 1975 followed by recentralization in 1981.133 
Thus it can be implied that the primary approach taken by the CPP/NPA leadership was a 
balanced one until the late 1970s because the party appeared interested in preserving its 
military on the one hand while expanding its political base on the other hand. 
This ideological thought guided the three-pronged strategy of the CPP/NPA.  
One, build the party; two, initiate the armed struggle; and three, forge a national united 
front. While the party’s ideology remained rooted in the theoretical works of Marx and 
Mao, the CPP/NPA appeared much more flexible and adaptable in terms of its 
interpretation in the unique context of the Philippines. This made the CPP/NPA an 
ideologically nondogmatic and flexible political party that was very similar to the NCP-
M as compared to the overtly rigid and dogmatic Shining Path.  
E. THE BEGINNING OF THE DECLINE 
The main turning point for the insurgency was its decision to boycott the 
presidential elections in 1985. This is significant in the sense that not only was the voter 
                                                 




turnout in these elections encouraging, but these elections were also successful in 
dislodging a dictator. This proved that the transfer of power, democratization, and 
transformation of a society could be achieved also through nonviolent political means. 
The boycotting of the election thus stands as a strategic mistake made by the communist 
party in recognizing a critical political opportunity. The difference between the fate of the 
NCP-M, who entered into a negotiated settlement with the government and subsequently 
participated in elections, and the fate of the CPP/NPA, who refused to participate in the 
elections, makes the point clear. The CPP/NPA made blunders in assessing popular 
sentiment, an increasingly hostile international environment, and, more importantly, in 
how critical the political opportunity presented to them was. By participating in the 
elections, they could have exploited the situation to achieve their objectives. 
The situation became more problematic for the CPP/NPA in 1987 when Sison 
tried to lead the communist movement towards a more “rigid orthodoxy.”134 This 
reaffirmation of orthodoxy led to a series of organizational splits. The CPP/NPA was 
embroiled in the internal struggle between the “reaffirmists” (pro-Sison) and the 
“rejectionists.”135 Magno names the decision not to participate in the political process 
and the continuation of the armed struggle as the “strategic political error” that led to 
disillusionment in the party ranks and the beginning of intense internal debates on 
ideology and strategy.136 The faction led by Sison, however, emerged victorious from 
these internal debates, and finally the CPP/NPA affirmed the original Maoist ideological 
principles by abandoning the innovative approaches previously adopted by the party. This 
supposed “rectification” of ideology was followed by bloody purges within its own ranks 
where many of the party cadres were tortured or killed by their own comrades. Broader 
infighting and further splits in the party were observed in the 1990s followed by the 
assassinations of rejectionist leaders like Felimon Lagman (former head of the Manila 
commission of the CPP), Arturo Tabara (former head of the Visyas commission of the 
                                                 
134 Alexander R. Magno, “The Filipino Left at the Crossroads: Current Debates on Strategy and 




CPP) and even Romulo Kintanar (former head of the NPA).137  Frequent clashes among 
rival insurgent armed units were also reported. The reversal of approach by the CPP/NPA 
against the pragmatic approach in the changed national and international context became 
counterproductive for the insurgency. 
Magno argues that the politico-military strategies during the early eighties were 
innovative and more devolutionary in nature. They involved armed action with mass 
mobilization in the cities, greater freedom for internal debate, and openness to genuine 
united front activities.138 This approach, in fact, reduced the primacy of the traditional 
Maoist notion of the importance of armed struggle, which did not appeal to the 
hardliners. For them, the party center was yielding too much authority to the regional 
commissions and was deviating from the ideological purity of Maoism. Thus Sison and 
the gang of hardliners implemented the “rectification” campaign that had a sense of 
“coherent ideological identity, comprehensive schematics and a uniform analysis of the 
revolutionary project.”139  This departure from innovation, pragmatism, and political 
primacy and move towards the classic, protracted struggle (despite significant gains) is 
difficult to explain and remains a puzzle for many.  
The NCP-M, on the other hand, had decided to stick to its “peace and 
constitution” agenda in Nepal. Despite pressures from the hardliners within the party and 
the risks involved, the party joined the mainstream. In the recent Central Committee 
meeting that took place in July 2010, the hardliners led by influential leader Mohan 
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seize power. However, the Central Committee decided to stick with parliamentary 
politics despite the failure of its chairman, Pushpa Kamal Dahal, to sack the Army chief 
when he was the Prime minister.140  
F. POLITICAL OBJECTIVES 
The CPP/NPA’s political objectives appear relatively tangible and attainable if 
compared to the Shining Path, however, they do not match the precision of the NCP-M. 
They preached “not just a change in leadership but a change in society,” although their 
vision of the new society was as obscure as it could be. Their case for structural reform 
was well-articulated and gave the hope of liberation from poverty to the peasants and 
promised them a new and more elevated status in society.141 The political objectives did 
suffer from the usual utopian vagueness of the Maoist vision, yet the objectives had a 
definite focus on land reform and social justice.142 This is possibly the reason that the 
insurgency continues to exist despite the progress made by the government in terms of 
democratic consolidation and socioeconomic reforms. The CPP/NPA’s offer for land 
reform, housing, and medical services keeps the peasants interested in supporting the 
insurgency and ensures its continuity.143  
The CPP/NPA advocated a national democratic revolution to overthrow the “semi 
colonial and semi feudal” system as a necessary transition to attain socialism and full 
economic and political sovereignty.144 Agrarian reform remained at the core of its radical 
land redistribution program which was to be implemented after seizure of political 
power.145 The party assumed the vanguard role and adopted the protracted people’s war 
strategy with workers and peasants as the main agents. However, they did not provide a 
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specific plan or agenda for this change. The NCP-M, on the other hand, although 
preaching a vague objective of “socio-economic transformation of the Nepalese state” 
articulated the clear political objectives of abolishing the monarchy, electing a constituent 
assembly to draft a new constitution, and establishing a federal system of governance 
along ethnic and geographic lines with considerable devolution of power to the states.146 
Clarity in political objectives for a twenty-first century insurgency is advantageous in 
many ways. First, it helps to guide party efforts towards achieving the objectives and 
keeps the cadres committed.  Second, it ensures continuity of support or sympathy from 
the reformist intelligentsia, civil society, general population, and even international 
community to an extent. Last, it allows for communication of reliable expectations and 
creates trust between the two conflicting parties, which makes negotiation possible. 
Despite the CPP/NPA’s demonstration of ideological flexibility and relative 
clarity of political objectives in the early phases, the insurgency jumped into the abyss of 
ideological rigidity and continued armed struggle. The shift is inexplicable yet very 
important because it marks a landmark contribution to the outcome of the insurgency. 
The relative success of the insurgency prior to the ideological reversal towards 
dogmatism and the failure of the insurgency after the policy shift are clear testimony to 
the challenges faced by a Maoist insurgency in a democratic society in which the 
grievances of the population can be addressed by other means.  
G. POPULAR SUPPORT 
Analysts consider popular support to be a critical element for insurgent success, 
because it is the primary resource that strengthens the will and capability of the insurgent 
movement. Popular support grows because of existing or perceived grievances that are 
heightened through careful framing of the issues. O’Neill further classifies popular 
support as active and passive and argues that active support of the population to the 
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extent that they are willing to “make sacrifices and risk personal harm for insurgent 
cause” is vital especially in the context of a protracted people’s war.147  
The dramatic rise of the CPP/NPA in the 1970s and early 1980s, its   steady 
decline during the late 1980s and the 1990s, and its current existence is a testimony to the 
changing nature of popular support in the insurgency. It is clear that the CPP/NPA was 
able to command a huge and active support of the population, especially among the rural 
poor, when the insurgency began. The ensuing decline of the CPP/NPA during the 
Acquino period indicated the growing inclination towards democratic electoral politics 
and translated into loss of support for the CPP/NPA because they boycotted the elections. 
Yet over 40 years of continued existence and the ability the CPP/NPA still has to 
influence the politico-security situation in the Philippines is a simple measure of the 
significant level of popular support it enjoys.  
Why, then, is an insurgency as popular and as persistent as the CPP/NPA not able 
to achieve the ultimate goals of the revolution? How did it end up losing the popular 
support it was enjoying? It is clear that loss of popular support compounded with other 
factors led to its failure. But more important is the question of what led to the loss in 
popular support. Is there a visible and tangible reason for the loss of popular support for 
the CPP/NPA? We saw that the ruthless terrorist methods used by the Shining Path and 
its emphasis on a military victory alienated the population from the insurgency. But the 
decline in popular support for the CPP/NPA was not because of its violence but rather 
because of the availability of speedy, alternative means of expressing dissent.  
The movement gained popularity by exploiting the socioeconomic grievances, the 
inequalities experienced by the rural peasants, and by presenting a viable alternative to 
the corrupt state led by Marcos. The insurgency played on the “inequalities of the 
existing landowning system, the insensitivity of the Marcos regime to the interest of poor 
farmers, the arbitrary and repressive local political and administrative structure, and the 
abuse of the military.”148 The CPP/NPA further used both persuasion and coercion to a 
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varying extent depending upon the circumstances. The insurgency made efforts to 
convince the peasants that the insurgent organization was committed to the peasants 
cause by appealing to the workers family interests and at the same time worked to incite 
cultural activism amongst the youths.149 It also used the coercive methods of monitoring 
and sanctioning in the villages including punitive actions and terrorism. 
The support gradually declined once the democratic regime of Mrs. Acquino 
came to power. The effective counterinsurgency campaign of the government slowly 
negated the coercive power of the CPP/NPA elements in rural areas, and as people started 
to feel less fear the support diminished. Similarly, the possibility of the resolution of 
socioeconomic problems through democratic governance led to a split in the CPP/NPA 
leadership with the moderates joining mainstream politics. The new government 
“expanded maneuvering space to elites, military, and the political left.”150 The CPP/NPA, 
rather than exploiting the open space to address the problems of the rural poor and the 
peasants, chose to continue the armed struggle. This came as a betrayal to the peasants 
who were expecting them to fulfill their previous commitments. The CPP/NPA’s decision 
not to participate in parliamentary politics signaled that the immediate interests of the 
lower class were in fact sacrificed.151 
The CPP/NPA’s loss of popular support can be explained in two ways. First is the 
loss of the coercive power that it used to exact subordination and support to the growing 
capability of the state apparatus, and second is the sense of betrayal felt by the peasants. 
By rejecting political participation the CPP/NPA chose not to influence the policies 
impacting the peasants. The second reason is very important as it relates to the 
importance of meeting popular expectations expeditiously in the twenty-first century 
through political participation. However, the Maoist dogma of complete transformation 
only through seizure of power prevented the party from doing so. 
                                                 




H. FINANCIAL SUPPORT 
The CPP/ NPA leadership was also affected by a lack of resources because of the 
changes in the international environment. Without countries such as the Soviet Union or 
China backing them, the CPP/NPA needed to raise funds from other sources. The CPP 
currently relies heavily on extortion, and the NPA has become its primary financial 
source. The CPP funds itself by collecting “revolutionary taxes through the NPA;” 
skimming  money off nongovernmental organizations sympathetic to the left; providing 
protection for criminal activities like extortion, kidnapping, drug trafficking, dollar 
counterfeiting, and illegal logging; extorting protection money from public officials; and 
siphoning money from projects funded with foreign money.152  
The need for twenty-first century communist insurgencies to be financially self-
reliant challenges them in many ways. First, ideology is becoming less and less 
compelling both for recruitment or extraction of external support because of its 
worldwide decline. Second, the sources of finance required to support the activities of the 
party and the armed wing are limited. The insurgency primarily depends upon taxation 
from the rural populace who themselves do not have enough money, and this further 
antagonizes the population. As Magno puts it “sites of the protracted war is rural areas, 
characterized by weak agricultural production, where the communist movement is largely 
distrusted by the wealthier classes and where the guerilla army operates precisely where 
the communities are the poorest, unable to support their own subsistence, much less 
adopt an orphaned revolutionary army.”153 
If the economic condition of the party is poor then the insurgents find it difficult 
to abide by the Maoist populist code. The NPA, however, tries to maintain a balance by 
performing certain “services” for the communities such as warning philandering 
husbands, summarily executing rustlers and rapists, returning stolen items, intimidating 
landlords, and many other services.  In return, they collect “revolutionary taxes.”154 The 
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funds thus raised are not sufficient to support the insurgency. In addition, the effects are 
negative because ultimately the poor people are the ones who are being taxed. The 
insurgency thus needs alternative means of generating finances, which forces them to 
establish a connection with organized criminal groups and the NPA is not an exception. 
The NPA has also collected protection money from illegal loggers in the past, and they 
continue to do so.155 Additionally, they have been collecting taxes from road-building 
contractors. This criminal activity does a disservice to the insurgency first because it 
provides the government with a legitimate excuse for repression, and second because it 
results in the loss of popular support. 
The NCP-M in Nepal, on the other hand, joined mainstream politics while it was 
ahead in the economic race. It was believed that they amassed a huge amount of money 
through extortion and bank robberies.156 However, they managed to mobilize a 
significant amount of money during the election of the constituent assembly, which gave 
them some advantage in the Nepalese environment.  
I. LEADERSHIP 
Although the leadership is one of the most influential factors in leading any 
insurgency, tensions between the goals of the leadership and its foot soldiers often exist. 
The leadership is usually made up of middle or upper class “alienated intellectuals” who 
are strongly committed to the ideals of Marxism and Leninism, whereas the soldiers are 
primarily “estranged peasants” committed to armed struggle as the means to obtain a 
degree of social justice.157 This inherent contradiction between the goals of the leadership 
and the followers is not uncommon in Maoist insurgencies. The followers expect quick 
deliverance and direct redress of their problems, but the leaders focus on seizure of power 
and total transformation, which are more difficult to achieve. In the end, ideology takes 
primacy among the leaders and their peasant comrades start to appear as “new class” to 
the leaders. This explains the famous purges carried out by Mao in China during the 
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Cultural Revolution and later copied by Pol Pot in Cambodia. The CPP/NPA also fell to 
similar urges when it purged many of its leaders, military commanders, and members 
during the rectification campaign. This highlights both the importance of leadership in 
guiding the approach of the insurgency and in internalizing the aspirations of its 
followers. 
As we observed in the previous chapter, the Shining Path’s weakness was the 
unquestioned authority of Guzman who preached a pure form of ideological thought. A 
similar trend can be seen in the CPP/NPA actions once they decided on rectification of 
the party. Sison and his lieutenants were able to lead the party towards Maoist orthodoxy. 
This became evident when the 1992 Central Committee document castigated “ultra-
democracy, liberalism, populism, social democracy and Gorbachevism.” The influence of 
Sison was strong in the strategic approach of the CPP, and he remained dogmatic. 
However, Marks points out that whatever success was achieved by the party was built 
upon operational and tactical flexibility, which occurred in Sison’s absence.158  
Sison, in his “revolutionary bible,” said that “there is no solution to the peasant 
problem but to wage armed struggle, conduct agrarian revolution and build revolutionary 
base areas.” 159 Similarly, Sison called the old communist cadres “revisionists” and 
“teachers by negative example,” which demonstrates his scorn for the institutional left. 
His insistence on guerilla action in rural areas until the populace was adequately 
politicized left less room for carrying out other forms of action such as urban 
mobilization.160 But, the big question is, when and how does the leadership know that an 
adequate foundation has been built for the final push to begin? 
The leadership of the CPP/NPA was clearly divided at the time the decision was 
taken to rectify the errors of the party. Kessler argues that the debate centered on the key 
question of whether to continue the “armed struggle” that emphasized the NPA, or the 
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“political struggle” that emphasized electoral and cause-oriented politics.161 In its 
ultimate dilemma, the executive committee of the CPP’s Central Committee took the 
decision to boycott the election. As Weekley documents, the vote of the executive 
committee was also divided. Three members voted for the boycott and two members 
voted against it. Similarly, the conclusions were different on the regional level as well.162 
This difference in analysis and subsequent strategy pursued by the insurgency were to 
have serious implications on its future.  
First, the decision resulted in polarization and subsequent splits throughout the 
CPP and thus weakened the party politically. Abinale argues that, had the CPP leadership 
decided to encourage participation in the elections, the party would have avoided its 
present predicament.163 The decision to boycott contributed to a further divide in the 
party, especially when it became apparent that a huge population enthusiastically 
participated in the elections even in the areas under CPP/NPA influence.164 Second, the 
boycott of the election assisted in the collapse of the Marcos regime. This regime was 
then replaced by a more popular and democratic government that further weakened the 
CPP/NPA cause. 
J. NEGOTIATIONS 
The primary question, for the purpose of this study, is to determine the approach 
taken by the insurgency based upon its attitude towards negotiation. The negotiations 
were ongoing as early as 1986. The Aquino government held peace talks from 1986–
1992, then the Fidel Ramos government continued negotiations from 1992–1998. Joseph 
Estrada also initiated talks during his tenure from 1998–2001. The government of Gloria  
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Macapagal-Arroyo suspended negotiations and ordered military operations against the 
insurgents in the wake of the 9/11 incidents. All the efforts to arrive at a negotiated 
settlement failed for a variety of reasons.  
Negotiations did not bear much fruit partly due to “policy inconsistencies in 
successive governments” and their preoccupation with “political survival.” On the other 
hand, the CPP/NPA also viewed negotiation as a part of the governments “divide and rule 
ploy.”165 The shifting strategies of the government and the insurgents only reinforced the 
existing mistrust between the two. While mistrust played a larger role in failed 
negotiations early on, the global war on terrorism further complicated the matter by 
blurring the lines between insurgency and terrorism. Soliman M. Santos Jr. comments 
that the “global war on terrorism caused significant damage to the Philippine peace 
process to end these conflicts.”166 In 1998, a four-point agreement was reached and a 
substantive agreement in respect to International Humanitarian Law and human rights 
was signed. However, the 9/11 incidents in the U.S. disrupted any possibility of further 
negotiations, and even the agreed framework of the JMC (Joint Monitoring Committee) 
achieved under the facilitation of the government of Norway could not further the stalled 
peace process.167 While the war on terrorism may seem to have damaged the peace 
process by hardening the government’s military response, its contribution in persuading 
the insurgents to seek political alternatives should not be discounted. 
At a cursory glance, it appears that negotiations were never ruled out either by the 
CPP/NPA and its political front NDF or the various governments, but hardliners on both 
sides seem to have prevailed over the ones arguing for negotiations. The military was 
able to convince the government to adopt a militarist approach in order to further their 
“corporate interests,” whereas the CPP/NPA remained “oriented towards its program of 
people’s war.”168 There is evidence that suggests that an element within the CPP/NPA 
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advocated genuine negotiations. The cadres in the Visyas and in Manila are quoted as 
having disagreed about the decision to not negotiate, and they criticized the party’s 
“tactical or utilitarian” view of negotiation as merely an extension of the armed 
struggle.169  
Peace negotiations between the government of the Philippines and the 
CPP/NPA/NDF, although encouraging, lack substantial progress over the years. It 
appears that political negotiation have always been a part of the CPP/NPA strategy,  but it 
is difficult to determine whether the negotiations were carried out with a genuine intent to 
terminate the conflict or just to gain a tactical advantage. Thus it is critical to determine 
just when the insurgent group is truly and genuinely interested in resolution of the 
problem through negotiation. Looking into the continued pursuit of a pure Maoist 
ideology, there is little hope that the CPP/NPA/NDF is seeking to resolve the issue 
through negotiation. 
K. ANALYSIS OF THE OVERALL APPROACH AND CONCLUSIONS 
The CPP/NPA is surviving, but it doesn’t appear to be capable of delivering a 
decisive blow to the Philippine government. Although it enjoys a good deal of consistent 
popular support,  a relatively disciplined guerrilla army, and a political network capable 
of implementing an effective united front strategy, the possibility of the CPP/NPA 
making good political gains either through negotiation and political participation or by a 
violent military move does not seem likely at the moment. This is despite the fact that, 
the Philippine state has been declining due to “continued political instability and 
economic problems” and is unable to genuinely and permanently address the 
socioeconomic grievances of the masses.170  
The odds are still against the CPP/NPA because it can no longer count on foreign 
support. The world community has had a serious rethink on the issue of the legitimacy of 
violence post-9/11, and, as a result, violent insurrection movements like the CPP/NPA 
                                                 
169 Mirian Coronel Ferer, The Communist Insurgency in the Philippines, 421. 
170 Marks, “From the Front Lines of GWOT,” 6. 
 57
are labeled as terrorist organizations by the international community. The U.S. already 
lists it as a terrorist organization, which makes it difficult to gain international legitimacy.  
Lack of external resources is also forcing it to use extortion and illegal activities 
to raise funds, which will further alienate it from the masses. The counterinsurgency 
capability of the Philippine government is gradually increasing and a trickledown effect 
of the socioeconomic progress in general keeps the masses interested in electoral politics 
more than the proposed communist alternative. The grievances and framings once very 
popular are losing their appeal and resources are not easily forthcoming, which will make 
it difficult for the CPP/NPA to achieve success unless it changes its current approach.  
Although the CPP/NPA is clearly adopting a much more pragmatic approach than 
the Shining Path, it still appears to be obsessed with the idea of a pure revolution through 
armed movement. Party ideology has been restored to strict Maoism, which denies them 
the opportunity to exploit political openings. The failure of the party to sustain popular 
support, the failure of its leadership to adapt to new political opportunities, and the 
reluctance to negotiate for political change and peace all appear to be the product of the 
rigidity of its military-dominant approach. Magno argues that in an attempt to maintain 
ideological purity through a centralized leadership, the CPP suffered serious setbacks. It 
can neither prevent the erosion of its cadre base nor can it exercise effective political 
control over its spread-out NPA units. In reality, the NPA has been exercising greater 
autonomy in making decisions and taking actions, and this has shifted the balance in 
favor of the military over politics.171 Similarly, its rejection of the “politico-military” 
orientation as proposed by the Manila-Rijal Party Committee back in 1991 for the 
primacy of armed struggle has been a true indication of the party’s reluctance to adopt 
politics as the dominant approach.172 
The CPP/NPA’s rigid Maoist orientation is a decisive factor shaping its 
involvement in electoral politics.173 Its incorporation of the Leninist principle of 
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“democratic centralism,” that encourages autocratic imposition of the party principles and 
discourages a constructive debate about the relevance of Marxism, has led to further 
ideological rigidity. At the same time, its current relative isolation from other communist 
movements across the globe also hinders it in the adoption of a flexible approach. 
Although the political arm of the movement engages the government in negotiations, 
neither side is considered to be serious about reaching a negotiated political settlement.174 
In the meantime, the CPP/NPA adopted a peculiar strategy during the 2004 
election called the “permit to campaign” (PTC) policy. It allows safe access for political 
parties to the rebel-controlled territory in exchange for money, weapons, or other 
materials and is very controversial.175 Although it is condemned by many as a form of 
extortion, the NPA practices it openly as “revolutionary taxation.”176 This brings an 
interesting question to the fore: What motivates the CPP/NPA to reject participation in 
the electoral process but authorizes it to facilitate the same in lieu of money? It could be 
explained that this is a rational choice dictated by circumstances. Since the CPP/NPA 
does not possess enough strength to seriously disrupt the election, it appears that the 
CPP/NPA has decided to exploit the election in order to consolidate its financial and 
material base. 
Democracy in the twenty-first century presents insurgencies with a very peculiar 
dilemma. Insurgents gain when they confront authoritarian and unresponsive 
governments, but they tend to lose their voices and have a hard time making their 
approach acceptable and palatable to a population that finds electoral politics to be a 
viable alternative means to seek redress to their grievances. Once the CPP/NPA decided 
to ignore politics, its decline began. Marks accentuates the idea that democracy makes 
insurgencies very vulnerable by saying “not only must it contend with rivals for political 
following but it must justify to prospective recruits why they should risk death.” In the  
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end, the CPP sulked out of politics and adopted a militarist approach for its survival. This 
approach has been counterproductive both in terms of a loss of popular support and the 
inability to decisively contest the Philippine state.   
On the other hand, the NCP-M in Nepal exploited all possible political 
opportunities to rise to power and influence. Although there is a huge debate over 
whether it is becoming more revisionist and hence selling out the revolution, or whether 
it is making progress, the NCP-M for the time being appears firmly on the balanced 
politico-military approach based upon a fusion of “bourgeoisie and people’s” 
democracy.177 The failure of the CPP/NPA in the Philippines might have served well to 
the Nepalese Maoists as a reminder of the futility of a military-dominant approach 
against a strong state in an unfavorable domestic and international context. 
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IV. THE NEPAL COMMUNIST PARTY-MAOIST (NCP-M) 
A. INTRODUCTION 
The insurgency in Nepal led by the NCP-M offers new insights on the 
development and practice of the Maoist ideology and raises important questions on the 
utility of classic Maoism and Mao’s people’s war strategy in the current global 
conditions. The Maoist insurgency in Nepal is the youngest communist insurgency that 
developed against a democratic government in a rapidly democratizing world. The 
Maoist insurgency in Nepal is similar to the insurgencies in Peru and Philippines in terms 
of environment, grievances and ideological orientation but is a sharp contrast with them 
in terms of outcome. While other insurgencies remained focused on the goal of 
overthrowing the state by delivering military defeat and failed, the NCP-M constantly 
revisited Maoism and oscillated its strategy between political and military means, and it 
ultimately opted for a negotiated settlement.   
In this chapter, I will attempt to demonstrate that pragmatic politics was the 
predominant component in the approach taken by the insurgency waged by NCP-M. I 
will do so by analyzing the NCP-M’s ideology and subsequent shifts, nature of the 
political objectives set out, the dominant thoughts of the leadership towards negotiation, 
external mediation, and political participation within the setting of initiation, 
development, and conclusion of the insurgency. I will compare the approach taken by the 
NCP-M to the classic approach taken by other insurgencies to establish a link between 
the approach and the final outcome of the insurgency.  
I will demonstrate how the NCP-M, following a Maoist people’s war strategy at 
least initially, reached a position of political dominance through innovative additions and 
modifications to the classical Marxist, Leninist, and Maoist ideology. I will also show 
how an insurgent movement can end in relative triumph if it exercises political flexibility 
and adaptability in response to the limitations and constraints faced by insurgencies of the 
twenty-first century.  
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B. BACKGROUND 
Similar to the Shining Path in Peru, the NCP-M in Nepal also began their armed 
movement against a democratically elected government that was installed after an 
absolute monarchy collapsed against the third wave of democracy. The “declaration of an 
end of (communist) ideology,” the lack of external support, and the supposed power of 
democracy to provide alternate means of protest did not prevent the Maoists from 
beginning and developing the insurgency.178 Once in motion, the insurgency spread 
quickly and soon threatened to take over the Nepalese state. The ten-year-long 
insurgency claimed more than 13,000 lives and resulted in the destruction of billions of 
dollars worth of infrastructure. The insurgency finally ended when a comprehensive 
peace agreement was reached between the NCP-M and the government.  The agreement 
co-opted major demands of the    NCP-M such as the abolishment of the Monarchy and 
election to a constituent assembly. The    NCP-M later participated in the constituent 
assembly elections and was able to secure the highest number of seats in the assembly. It 
then led the government for nine months before the party chairman and Prime Minister 
Pushpa Kamal Dahal, alias Prachanda (the fierce one), resigned.  
Although a communist insurgency in some form existed in Nepal from the early 
1950s, it officially came into being with the declaration of people’s war by the NCP-M 
on February 13, 1996. The NCP-M is a breakaway faction led by Prachanda from the 
Communist Party of Nepal, Unity Center (CPN-UC), which was a conglomeration of 
three different communist parties.179 The new party, during its third plenum in March 
1995, decided to call itself the Nepal Communist Party (Maoists). This was a clear 
declaration of its ideological tilt towards Maoism. They also determined that all other left 
parties were revisionists and decided to “concentrate all efforts for the development of a 
people’s war” to bring in a new people’s democratic form of government.180  
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In February 1996, the UPFN (United People’s Front, Nepal), the open political 
wing of the NCP-M, submitted its demands to the government in a 40-point document. 
The demands related to nationalism, people’s democracy, and livelihood and included an 
ultimatum stating that the UPFN would initiate insurgency if the demands were not met. 
The demands encompassed both the genuine grievances related to ending discriminatory 
land rights and declaring Nepal a secular state, and they also included some utopian 
ideals such as employment for all. 181 When the government failed to provide a response, 
the party went underground and started its preparation of political teachings and 
propaganda from the rural, Midwestern district of Rolpa. In October 1996, the 
government ordered a police-led operation against the Maoists after a clash between the 
cadres of UPFN/NCP-M and the Nepali Congress, which further prepared the ground for 
armed movement.182  
The insurgents intensified their momentum in 2000 by attacking and displacing 
police outposts and government infrastructures in various parts of the country. By 
November 2001 the Maoist armed wing had already become so strong and daring that it 
was able to attack and capture an army subunit location. The government quickly 
declared a state of emergency and mobilized the Nepalese Army against the insurgency 
in November 2001.183 Despite the mobilization of the Nepalese Army against the 
insurgents, the Maoists were able to extend their influence in 31 of the 75 districts in 
Nepal. At this time the government stated that four of the districts were highly influenced 
by the insurgents and the rest of the districts were partially influenced by the end of 
2001.184 By 2002 the Maoists de facto controlled a significant portion of the nation and 




                                                 
181 Lawoti, “The Evolution and Growth of Maoist Insurgency in Nepal,” 7. 
182  Thapa and Sijapati, A Kingdom Under Seize: Nepal’s Maoist Insurgency, 48. 
183 Ibid., 45–49. 
184 Ibid., 46.  
 64
be summed up by the fact that the Maoists “Zone of action” covered all 75district centers, 
they had declared “people’s government” in a number of districts, they were running 
“people’s court,” and they controlled the basic health and educational services.185  
As is not unusual in an insurgency, there was a vast difference in how the 
government, the Maoists, and independent observers reported the Maoist capability. Paul 
Moorcraft places the number of rebel forces around 15,000 with part-time cadres of about 
50,000, whereas the government of Nepal estimated the number to be 4,000 to 5,000 and 
15,000.186 Regardless of the numbers, it was a known fact that the Maoist armed wing 
was successful in challenging the government forces at a place of their choosing, 
regardless of the outcome of it. The situation was perceived to be so grave that observers 
were starting to feel that the Nepalese Army and the government would not be able to 
prevent a Maoist victory in Nepal.187 Although the government forces were able to 
operate in any of the districts freely, the Maoists de facto controlled the daily lives of the 
people in the absence of administrative mechanisms and government presence in many of 
the districts across the country.   
Multiple attempts at negotiation between the government and the NCP-M failed 
primarily due to the inability of those governments to make decisions on the issues 
presented by the Maoists. Also, no government was able to stay in power for a sustained 
period of time due to interparty and intraparty conflicts. In the meantime, the infamous 
royal massacre of June 2001, in which most members of the royal family were killed, 
brought King Gyanendra to the throne. Unlike his brother, King Birendra, who remained 
within constitutional norms, King Gyanendra dismissed the elected prime minister in 
February 2005, imprisoned political leaders, and assumed direct rule when asked by the 
prime minister to postpone the impending general election. The alienated political parties 
organized as the SPA (Seven Party Alliance) and then formed an antimonarchy alliance 
with the Maoists. In a calculated move, the Maoists declared a ceasefire in September 
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2005 and supported the street protests of the SPA with the hopes of ending the autocratic 
monarchy and electing a constituent assembly to draft a new constitution. Interestingly, 
the negotiations and agreement were mediated not by domestic actors but by neighboring 
India.188 The joint protests ultimately forced King Gyanendra on April 2006 to give up 
direct rule and reinstate the parliament he had dismissed earlier. The reinstated 
parliament led by Girija Prasad Koirala signed a comprehensive peace agreement with 
the NCP-M in November 2006. After 12 long years of insurgency, the NCP-M finally put 
down its weapons and entered into mainstream politics with shared participation in the 
new government. Although the peace process is still incomplete and the NCP-M is 
currently struggling to get back to power in Nepal, it was successful in forcing the 
government to accommodate its demands and in becoming the largest party in the 
constituent assembly elections.189 
What is unique about the NCP-M is that it was successful in inciting and 
developing its people’s war against a democratically elected government in adverse 
regional and international contexts. In addition, unlike other insurgencies, it used the 
element of violence to further its aims only in a selective manner and as long as the 
utilization of violence was deemed necessary. It also exploited the strategy of united front 
to carry forward its open activities and made political alliances with legal parties 
whenever expedient. Also, it was able to gain from the intervention of a regional power 
and international community favoring its own position. This is an unprecedented example 
of both a Maoist insurgency embracing pragmatic politics and the selective use of 
violence because of an accurate assessment of local, regional, and global conditions to 
reach a position of power. In summary, the NCP-M was able to execute a balanced 
politico-military approach to insurgency that was not seen in the other two Maoist 
insurgencies. 
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C. GRIEVANCES LEADING TO THE INSURGENCY 
Adhikary argues that, although it is difficult to fathom the Maoist decision to 
begin people’s war while adequate space was available in the democratic system, the 
insurgency received support primarily because of the frustration of the common people 
with the ability of the democratic system to fulfill their expectations.190 Lawoti attributes 
the factors of poverty, sociocultural and economic inequality, and exclusionary 
characteristics of the state as the primary contributors.191 There is little argument about 
the fact that the degeneration of the democratic political culture expressed in terms of 
intraparty feuds for power combined with the inability of the state to address serious 
socioeconomic problems remained at the heart of the insurgency.  
Although the sociopolitical and economic conditions of Nepal in the 1990s 
appeared to be improving, they were in fact conducive to revolutionary movements. 
Thapa argues that although democracy came to Nepal in 1990, there had been many years 
of consistent communist indoctrination in certain parts of rural Nepal, especially the four 
districts of Midwestern Nepal (Rolpa, Rukum, Salyan, and Jajarkot) combined with the 
hardship and state neglect suffered by the population in those areas. These factors meant 
that the country had already been “primed for a revolutionary movement.”192   
Politically, it would appear that the population should not have supported the 
insurgency in 1990 because the nation had just emerged from a long period of absolute 
monarchy and was practicing parliamentary democracy under a liberal constitution. But 
many felt that the revolution was incomplete because the 1990 constitution, which 
represented the democratic change, was a compromise between the monarchy and the 
political parties.193 This compromise, it is argued, resulted in the retention of many 
traditional, feudal, illiberal, and discriminatory political characteristics. The Nepali 
Congress government “did little during its governance to deal with issues facing the 
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nation,” and was involved largely in an intraparty power struggle.194 Additionally, the 
main opposition left-wing party, the United Marxist Leninist (UML), still had an 
unfulfilled republican agenda in their party manifesto. This was while even liberal 
democratic parties were uneasy with the monarch’s power, especially with his ability to 
control the Nepalese Army.195  
Economically, Nepal remained in extremely poor conditions despite a degree of 
growth and progress. The economic problem was, however, not the immediate product of 
democratic governance but was inherited from the past because of the centralized 
economic system that retained feudal characteristics.196 The Nepalese economy had not 
been doing well since the 1960s and the 1970s; however, what led to the insurgent 
outburst was the inability of the new democratic system to address the already existing 
grievances. The Gross National Income (GNI) of Nepal per capita was U.S. $290.00 in 
2006, which was the lowest in South Asia except for Afghanistan.197 Over 40 percent of 
the people were living below the poverty line and did not have access to basic services. 
Whatever development and distribution of resources the new democratic structure 
brought, especially in the banking sector, they were accessed by the rich and did not 
trickle down to the poor. Lawoti and Pahari argue that although national economic 
indicators improved, economic inequality also increased with Nepal becoming the most 
unequal country in South Asia.198   
Socially, many issues of inequality and discrimination continued to exist in the 
democratic period, which led to further alienation of the marginalized people. Land 
ownership had remained a lingering unresolved issue from the Nepali land reform 
economics. Despite efforts from the various governments of the past, a large number of 
peasants still did not have property rights. Minority and ethnic groups were not happy 
with the declaration of the nation as the only Hindu kingdom in the world and the 
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continuation of the fact that the Hindu upper caste dominated state politics and resulted in 
further marginalization of the minorities. This was well-exploited by the Maoists to 
mobilize the underprivileged ethnic groups from the landmasses of the rural Midwestern 
hills where the government presence was nominal.199 The upper caste Hindu elite 
continued to dominate the political parties and hold important portfolios in the 
government bureaucracy and civil service, and they were prominent in the state police 
and the armed forces.200 This made available a large base of disgruntled people as a 
potential resource for social mobilization.  
Repression and state weakness also added momentum to the movement. The 
police actions at the beginning of the insurgency were alleged to be characterized by 
random arrests, torture, alleged rape, and even extra-judicial killings that led to the 
alienation of a large segment of the population, increased the support for the NCP-M, and 
provided the NCP-M with recruits.201 Similarly, the Nepalese Army operations also drew 
a lot of criticism for their disregard for human rights. Analysts were quick to point out 
that the rise of the movement was largely due to the “failure of democratic governments 
to implement   viable socioeconomic reforms and an effective counterinsurgency 
strategy.”202 
Despite the advent of democracy and the introduction of a free market economy, 
the nation largely remained discriminatory in terms of addressing the issues of political 
representation and socio-cultural inequality. Similarly, the economy remained 
centralized, and the divide between the center and the periphery grew further. Marks 
noted that given such socioeconomic divisions, politics should have played a more 
significant role, but unfortunately Nepal was also mired in the all-too-familiar problems 
of emerging democracies.203 The failure of the democratic government to address the 
pressing issues of historic neglect and discrimination towards the rural communities and 
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breach the gap of social inequality contributed highly to the successful prospect of 
framing these grievances in communist ideological alternatives for the insurgents. 204  
The NCP-M ably tapped into the grievances of all sections of the society, and 
especially the peasants, by using attractive slogans such as “land for the tillers.” 
Interestingly, democracy, which was supposed to deliver both socio sociopolitically and 
economically, in fact acted as an agent for the insurgency because on the one hand it 
represented cronyism, corruption, and continuation of the same order and thus assisted 
the insurgents in convincing the populace that they had a better ideological alternative.205 
On the other hand it allowed the insurgents to freely carry out their propaganda and 
political organizing activities within the liberal environment. In summary, there are many 
similarities in the grievances that were available as a resource for Maoist mobilization in 
Peru, the Philippines, and Nepal. The Nepalese case differs from the other two only in the 
way the insurgents were able to craft and sell their idea of an alternative structure that 
would address the grievances.  
D. IDEOLOGY 
The NCP-M claims that its ideology, since 1986, is Marxism-Leninism and 
Maoism (MLM).206 The party later adopted the “Plan for the historic initiation of the 
People’s war” in September 1995, which clearly laid out the theoretical premises of 
Marxism-Leninism and Maoism with primary emphasis on the practice of Mao’s 
people’s war doctrine. The paper also spoke of refraining from any form of deviations 
like “economism, reformism and anarchism” and concentrated on capture of state power 
through armed struggle and nothing less.207 The plan specifically mentions the idea of 
“marching to communism” and considers armed struggle as the primary means to achieve 
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it. The peasants were to be the primary agents of change along with other “laboring 
masses.”208 The paper also outlined a clear strategy of building a revolutionary united 
front and a revolutionary army under the leadership of the party. This is indicative of its 
positive attitude towards the united front strategy and willingness to employ the armed 
wing as the major tool to achieve its objective. It also indicates that the political wing is 
to exercise greater control of the military wing.  
The NCP-M had begun their insurgency based upon the classical Maoist 
approach. In the “third plenum” of the breakaway faction led by Prachanda, the Central 
Committee stated that “the People’s war will be based on the lessons of Marxism-
Leninism and Maoist regarding revolutionary violence … process of protracted people’s 
war based on the strategy of encircling the city from the countryside … reiterating its 
eternal commitment to the theory of people’s war developed by Mao as the universal and 
invincible Marxist theory of war.”209  Similarly, the party also stated that the basic 
objective of the revolution was to smash the state of dictatorship of the feudal comprador 
and bureaucratic capitalist classes and replace it with a new democratic one.210 These 
comments demonstrate the early tilt of the NCP-M, which can be called ideologically 
orthodox for a Maoist movement. 
But at the same time there existed an influence of “opportunism” in its ideology 
as practiced by Lenin. The plan, quoting Lenin, explicitly stated that the party would be 
able to lead the people’s war only by “correctly grasping the law of contradiction of 
transformation of wrong into right,” which was in response to the acknowledgement that 
the people’s war would ultimately develop in unusual and complex situations.211 
Recognition of the constraints in pursuing the revolution in the classic sense allowed the 
NCP-M to remain flexible in its approach, which is unique to the movement. Although 
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primacy of contextual factors in the development of the movement were recognized by 
both the Shining Path and the CPP/NPA, the NCP-M alone was able to truly adapt to the 
complexity of the situations by remaining flexible.  
This ideological flexibility was a matter of debate in the NCP-M and the Nepalese 
communist movement from early on. Reacting to criticism that by making innovations to 
the MLM way of thinking the party had become revisionist, Prachanda explained that the 
difference between revisionism and MLM lies in recognizing that ideology is not static 
but dynamic. He then equated ideological development with “breaking with continuation 
and rupture to make a leap,” clarifying that MLM is not reformism based upon 
gradualism but a true revolutionary ideology.212 Till this point the NCP-M appeared to be 
influenced by the same ideological dogma as other communist movements. However, it 
had a definite recognition that traditional communist ideologies needed a new 
interpretation based upon a better understanding of the contextual factors. 
The plan also had an international agenda. The NCP-M considered itself an 
integral part of the “world proletarian revolution” that would serve the global revolution, 
and it sought to contribute to the further development of the “Revolutionary International 
Movement (RIM).”213 The NCP-M had drawn lessons from communist movements 
across the world and primarily from the Shining Path and the Indian Naxal movements, 
and it tried to share ideas and resources with them. Although the party later drew 
criticism from the RIM for participating in the peace process, initially it considered the 
RIM to be an organization that represented proletarian internationalism, thus Prachanda 
comments, “If people’s war in Nepal faces setbacks, then it will not only be a question 
for the NCP-M but a direct question for the RIM as a whole.” 
E. SHIFTS IN IDEOLOGY 
The NCP-M embarked on a pragmatic path only after its second National 
Conference in 2001. The decisions of the conference were crucial because they 
empowered the party chairman tremendously by declaring that the “guiding thought of 
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the Party from now onwards will be Marxism-Leninism-Maoism and Prachanda Path.”214 
The paper presented by Prachanda during the conference not only clarified the party’s 
position and policies towards various groups of the society such as women, students, 
workers, and peasants, but the paper also proposed a way to begin a dialogue with 
different sections of society. The dialogue would be held as a “conference of all political 
parties, organizations, and representatives of mass organizations, elections of an interim 
government by such a conference; and guarantee of people’s constitution under the 
leadership of the interim government.” The NCP-M justified the various rounds of 
negotiation and the three key demands as the keys to achieving the objectives. Adoption 
of the Prachanda Path provided the NCP-M an avenue to escape unrealistic classical 
methods of Maoism. The Prachanda Path was to assume a kind of revolution that would 
be a fusion of the Chinese model of protracted war (taken up in the beginning) and the 
Russian model of general armed insurrection but in reality it was a modification of the 
overall Maoist idea of the continuation and conclusion of the revolution.215 
This was a major change in the approach of the NCP-M, which had previously 
vehemently opposed partial reforms or reaching a compromise with the reactionary 
classes. This was important because it not only publicized the demands of the NCP-M 
clearly, paving the way for future negotiations and peaceful resolution of the conflict, but 
it also indicated a shift in its ideological dogma of waging a protracted people’s war in 
purely military terms.  
The NCP-M arrived at some major decisions during the meeting of its Central 
Committee held in the Chunbang village of the Rukum district in the Midwestern region 
of Nepal during September and October of 2005. Amidst growing debate between the 
senior leadership about whether to join with the parliamentary parties against the 
monarchy for the establishment of a  federal republic or to join with the nationalist forces 
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led by the monarchy, the party decided to work with the political parties.216 This decision 
was crucial in polarizing the Nepalese political forces and resulted in the elimination of 
the monarchy, which was one of Nepal’s oldest and key centers of power. This is a very 
good example of the NCP-M grasping political opportunity. While the Shining Path 
continued to reject any alliances with the legal left in Peru, the NCP-M in Nepal not only 
joined hands with its revisionary comrades but also with the liberal parties who it used to 
consider the “enemy” in the past. 
The NCP-M leadership has emphasized the need to not “cling to dogma and 
rather try to apply Marxism to the concrete situation of Nepal.”217 The Balaju (a place in 
Kathmandu) plenum in 2007 demonstrated the amount of flexibility the party and the 
leadership were ready to exercise. At this plenum there was heated debate between the 
hardliners and the moderates about whether to strive for a “people’s republic” as outlined 
in the classic Communist sense or a “democratic republic” of a parliamentary nature.218 
The party adopted the latter in favor of the peace process and the writing of a new 
democratic constitution in which it indicated its ideological flexibility. The NCP-M came 
to the conclusion that a bourgeois democratic revolution was first needed to install a 
bourgeois democratic republic as the political superstructure in Nepal. This was needed 
in order to replace the feudal structure represented by the monarchy before a “new 
proletarian democracy” could be achieved.219 
Maoist leadership sometimes claims that it has not deviated from the people’s war 
strategy and considers this shift to be a part of the strategy, but it is difficult to perceive 
the Maoist’s going back to the battlefield.  Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, the deputy chairman 
of the party, in an interview later claimed that although the NCP-M made certain changes 
in its tactical line after 2006, these changes should not be confused with abandoning 
protracted people’s war forever and the adoption of a peaceful path of social 
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development. He argues that “People’s war is a multifaceted war where both the armed 
and political form of struggle needs to be combined.”220 He highlights the need for taking 
note of the existing balance of forces, both politically and militarily in the country and 
outside the country because this balance will have implications. First, it will be difficult 
to capture the state power, and second, even after capturing the state power it will be 
difficult to sustain it.221 His comments reflect the NCP-M’s objective view of the 
domestic as well as regional and global context, which is a key to understanding the shift 
in the NCP-M both in terms of ideology and strategy.  
Although it is not completely clear what factors prompted the NCP-M to adopt a 
flexible approach, the changed global context and intraparty debate that favored 
preserving the achievements of the party gained by the people’s war are speculated to be 
the primary reasons.  Marks believes “knowing that NCP-M could not defeat the state, 
international actors (including India) were initially willing to aid the state” to an extent 
that the Maoists would be defeated.222 It was, however, clever on the part of the Maoists 
to see that while prolonged people’s war would have benefited them, its continuation 
would be futile for the movement’s future. It was this reality that drove the Maoist shift 
in emphasis between its lines of operation.223 The party meanwhile remained in active 
debate throughout 2002 and 2003 over whether to join the multiparty politics or not. The 
negotiations that followed failed for various reasons that will be discussed in detail later 
in the chapter. It is difficult to ascertain whether the NCP-M was sincere about resolving 
the issue through negotiation, but it can be implied that the NCP-M was not ideologically 
averse to the prospect of negotiation. In the end, the NCP-M appears to be cautious of the 
pitfalls of becoming mired in traditional communist fundamentalism, hence, it chose to 
change as the socioeconomic and political context of Nepal and the world changed.  
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F. POLITICAL OBJECTIVES 
The political objectives of the NCP-M can be summarized as establishing a 
Maoist people’s republic in order to achieve socioeconomic and political transformation 
of the Nepalese society. While the official documents of the party are somewhat vague 
and declare that establishment of the “dictatorship of the proletariat” is the ultimate 
objective of the party, the NCP-M had not been able to articulate what it means by that. 
The party was able to come up with clear demands that reflected its political objectives 
along with the modality to achieve them during the first round of negotiations itself.  
Initially its political demands included an end to the monarchy and the writing of 
a new constitution through an elected constituent assembly. Similarly, it advocated for an 
end to capitalist exploitation and establishment of scientific socialism on the economic 
side. Socially, it demanded a secular Nepal and an end to caste, ethnic, and religious 
exploitation.224 Later, the establishment of a federal structure for Nepal was added to the 
demands as a means to achieve the appropriate devolution of power to various regions. 
Although the abovementioned objectives appear straightforward and tangible, there is 
still debate about whether these are the final objectives of the NCP-M since its primary 
objective is to “establish the dictatorship of the proletariat,” which is translated as 
establishing a single-party communist regime.  
It is difficult to determine whether the political approach of the Maoists is a 
genuine one or just another tactical move. Marks, out of his skepticism, commented that 
some apologists don’t even want to discuss the aim. Marks also draws a parallel with the 
Sandinistas who used democracy to solidify their Marxist-Leninist version of democracy 
or the “people’s democracy,” which is a concrete manifestation of the “dictatorship of the 
proletariat.” Prachanda had explained this to be a “serious policy decision” saying that 
the NCP-M is ready for peaceful competition within a democratic situation.225 Despite 
the contradictory nature of remarks made by the Maoist leadership, it is difficult to argue 
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with the logic that the NCP-M has at the moment shifted the focus of its approach to 
conventional politics in the light of its current political objectives. 
G. UNITED FRONT STRATEGY 
The NCP-M, similar to the CPP/NPA, realized the gains of implementing a united 
front strategy in the Nepalese context. Because of this it established highly coordinated 
fronts in the form of its sister organizations representing sectors such as students, 
peasants, workers, trade unions, intellectuals, women, scheduled castes, and indigenous 
groups. These served two purposes, the first of which was to “bring up class issues from 
each specialized perspective and to implement restructuring policies while at the same 
time battle inequality in a way supporting the constituents,” and the second of which was 
to provide the backbone for organizing protests and to work as aggressive pressure 
groups against the state.226  The   NCP-M also reached agreements with other groups in 
the society by forming various fronts such as the Terai Madhesi Mukti Morcha (Terai 
Madhesi Liberation Front) that advocated for the rights of the minority plains people in 
the South of Nepal and Adhivasi Janajati Mukti Morcha (Indigenous and Ethnic Peoples 
Liberation Front) working for the rights of the various minority indigenous groups in 
Nepal. 
Furthermore, while the fringe left parties of Nepal were already being attracted to 
the NCP-M, a new turn of events pushed even the democratic parties towards the Maoists 
cause. Once the King assumed direct rule by dismissing Prime Minister Sher Bahadur 
Deuba once again in February 2005, it led to an antimonarchy polarization between 
democratic parties and the NCP-M. The NCP-M quickly called for a ceasefire and 
decided to negotiate with the democratic parties who felt betrayed by the same monarchy 
they were trying to save in the beginning. Marks states that the royal move “provided the 
NCP-M with the basis for a viable united front,” that other Maoist insurgencies either 
chose to ignore or could not forge.227 The Seven Party Alliances (SPA), consisting of 
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seven major democratic political parties, and the NCP-M entered into an alliance that was 
brokered by Delhi (obviously “pursuing geopolitical ends”) that simultaneously cut off 
all military aid to the Nepalese Army including desperately needed ammunitions.228 The    
NCP-M was thus able to forge a 12-point agreement with the SPA that would later 
catapult it to state power. The  ability of the NCP-M to convince the legal left and the 
democratic parties that it had “developed a new maturity” and had reached the conclusion 
that the “capture of state power through the barrel of the gun” was not possible was a 
master stroke in terms of exploiting the political approach based upon the evaluation of 
the military situation.229 
H. EXTERNAL FACTOR /SUPPORT 
Contrary to popular belief, the NCP-M is a homegrown insurgency that did not 
receive any support from neighboring communist China. In contrast, whatever form of 
support the Maoists of Nepal were able to derive was from democratic India. Although 
there is no evidence that the government of India supported the Maoists and India 
declared the Maoists a terrorist organization even before the Nepalese government did, 
the NCP-M leaders conspicuously and consistently found safe havens in Indian states.230 
The NCP-M frequently organized meetings at various places in India. One such example 
was the meeting of communist leaders in West Bengal in 2001.  The NCP-M was also 
able to forge very close relationship with Indian Maoists in both the legal left parties and 
with the violent Naxals. Deepak Thapa notes that the Nepalese Maoists had received 
support from Indian ultra-leftists in terms of “shelter and training and possibly access to 
illegal arms market” in India.231 
While rejection of any external involvement proved to be a strategic weakness in 
the Shining Path approach, the withdrawal of foreign support became a major setback to 
the CPP/NPA. The NCP-M in comparison was able to recognize the potential gains from 
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external involvement as it saw the lack of legitimacy in the consecutive governments and 
the monarchy. The NCP-M successfully exploited the concern of the foreign actors, 
primarily in India, to strike the groundbreaking deal with the SPA that not only 
neutralized the monarchy and the army but also catapulted the NCP-M to power. The 
NCP-M, although it publicly criticized India as its final enemy, was constantly in 
dialogue with the Indian establishment, which was concerned about the Maoist spillover 
effect in its territory.232 The NCP-M did not solicit direct foreign support from India but 
cleverly capitalized on the security concerns that forced India to intervene in a manner 
that ultimately benefited the insurgents. 
The Indian government, concerned by the prospect of the Maoist spillover effect 
and the possibility of a “red corridor” running across the two countries, initially was in 
support of the Nepalese government. It not only helped capture prominent Maoist leaders 
including Chandra Prasad Gajurel, but it also provided the Nepalese army with 
significant military assistance in fighting the Maoists. Other critical foreign actors have 
been the members of the Indian “legal left.” The leaders of the Communist Party of India-
Maoist (CPI-M) were instrumental in bringing the NCP-M and the SPA together. They 
were also very active in mediating between the NCP-M and the SPA during the later 
phase of transition from royal rule to the restoration of the dissolved parliament.233 The 
Indian state for its part was seen playing an active role not only in facilitating 
negotiations but also in determining the political outcomes post conflict termination.  
All other stakeholders and friends of Nepal were mostly caught in a dilemma 
about how to engage with the situation in Nepal. The initial trend was that of support to 
the state to fight against the communist insurgents and provide humanitarian support to 
the suffering population. But as the insurgency grew, the external actors started to realize 
that Nepal “might offer an opportunity for conflict resolution success.” Similarly, they 
viewed the insurgency not only as a violent communist movement but as a genuine 
“political conflict over the nature of Nepal’s government and social and political 
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inequities.”234 Contrary to what the state tried to portray, that the NCP-M was hell-bent 
on capturing state power through the barrel of a gun, the international community 
increasingly believed that since a military victory was not possible, a political 
compromise between the NCP-M and the government of Nepal could be reached. The 
other challenge the international community faced was that of how to deal with India, 
because India considered any outside intervention in Nepal to be unwarranted and was 
categorically against “third party mediation, UN or otherwise.”235 
The Maoists get credit for being able to create the impression that theirs was not a 
fight for state capture as in the classic Maoist sense but was a way of addressing the 
genuine grievances of the population. This was achieved in two ways. First, the Maoists, 
by allowing international organizations to operate in the area under their de facto control, 
were able to establish a rapport with them and gain a degree of legitimacy. Second, the 
Maoists were able to divert international attention towards their “most democratic 
demand of an election for constituent assembly by a party that is waging people’s 
war.”236 The contradiction that a party waging people’s war was demanding elections 
whereas parliamentary parties were against such demands made a huge impression on the 
international community about the genuineness of the Maoist demands.   
One important fact that eludes many is the ability of the NCP-M to project the 
insurgency as the manifestation of genuine grievances of the Nepalese population and not 
a sinister design of communist takeover. While it played on the vulnerability of the 
Indian establishment to its spillover effect, it was able to exploit the international opinion 
to its advantage during the negotiation phase. Similarly, the involvement of United 
Nations (UN) in the role of monitoring of the CPA and other subsequent agreements was 
another measure of success for the NCP-M. 
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In summary, the degree and intensity of external involvement and their 
effectiveness in facilitating the end of armed insurgency in Nepal was motivated by a 
genuine concern for the human losses and suffering and their changed perception about 
the nature of the problem and the possibility of a successful resolution. Additionally, the 
Indian involvement was guided more by their geo-security concerns. It brings the 
understanding that although the essence remains the same the method of using the 
“international line of action” proposed by Mao has now changed. The NCP-M 
demonstrated their ability to grasp the changed nature of the international environment 
and was able to exploit it to gain similar effect as it would do in classical Maoist sense. 
This is significant because of the amount of influence exercised by these international 
agencies in the affairs of the state. The NCP-M had understood that it is important to deal 
with the international agencies to ensure that even if the insurgents do not gain the 
sympathy or support, the state also does not gain their sympathy or support.  
I. NEGOTIATIONS 
Since the NCP-M did not even wait for the deadline it had given the government 
to expire to declare people’s war, it raises the question as to whether the party was 
serious about any form of negotiation about their demands. Many believe that even if the 
government had come up with a genuine response, it would not have prevented the NCP-
M from declaring people’s war. But as the insurgency progressed and situations changed, 
the party appeared more flexible towards negotiations.  
Prachanda did not negate the utility of negotiation as a strategy when he admitted 
that “our guiding principles on the question of negotiations are the experiences and 
summation of  the Brest-Litovsk Treaty and Chunking negotiations under Mao,” referring 
to the incidents where the communists were able to consolidate their power by entering 
into negotiations.237 At the same time he also expressed his suspicions about the state 
using negotiations as a means to “engineer a split in the revolutionary movement,” but he 
asserted that there should be no apprehension about talks that should be in the “defense of 
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the basic interests of the people.”238 This demonstrates the attitude of the NCP-M 
towards political negotiations and armed actions. There is no denying the fact that the 
NCP-M in Nepal relied heavily upon the actions of its military wing that included 
performing acts of terrorism during the insurgency, but at the same time, it continued to 
work for and engage in political negotiations.  
As I have alluded earlier, it is important to determine when the insurgents are 
most genuinely interested in conducting negotiations.  Lawoti and Pahari argue against 
the popular notion that peace settlements are an outcome of “hurting stalemates,” because 
they state that the NCP-M was neither in stalemate nor hurting when it came for the first 
round of peace negotiations in 2001.239 The insurgency was able to make significant 
progress both in extending its political grip across the country and in developing its 
armed elements because the Army was not yet deployed against them. This is a good 
example that shows that the NCP-M was not averse to negotiations. But it is still not clear 
whether they were looking for a political solution or in gaining a degree of public 
legitimacy. There existed a widespread perception that the NCP-M showed a willingness 
to seek a political solution through negotiations only to gain a tactical advantage, and ,as 
it turns out, the negotiations were extensive and many times the parties came close to 
striking a deal.240 
The NCP-M was said to have entered into negotiations believing that it could 
consolidate its political standing mainly for two reasons: first, it would give it legitimacy, 
and second, it was a timely public relations exercise. By the end of the first negotiations 
the NCP-M was able to establish itself as the “officially recognized counter-state at par 
with the government from a group that was seen as desperado.” 241 At the same time, the 
Maoist leaders were able to make their mark upon the general population and 
intelligentsia. Tactically, they were able to secure the release of many political prisoners 
and gain time for the armed wing, and strategically, they achieved the status of the 
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counterstate by putting their revolutionary ideas openly to the general public. The first 
round of talks failed because both the NCP-M and the government were so entrenched in 
their positions that they could not move any further. Nevertheless, the talks gave both 
sides an opportunity to have a better understanding of each other and also paved the way 
for the establishment of informal contacts that helped to establish reliable expectations. 
The second round of talks began in April 2003 and went on till August, and these 
talks also failed to yield any substantial outcome. While the Maoists broke from the 
peace talks citing an incident where 17 of its members were allegedly killed by the Army 
after capture in Doramba (a place in Eastern Nepal), the deadlock was caused by the 
refusal of the government to accept the Maoists demand for a constituent assembly.242 
The governments involved in negotiations were not stable and also lacked adequate 
authority and legitimacy to make concrete decisions. First, because the prime ministers 
were frequently changed by the King, and second, because they did not have the support 
of other political parties that were against any agreement that bypassed them. 243 The 
governments were unable to hold elections and hence lost popular legitimacy and became 
dependent upon the discretionary authority of the constitutional monarch who held “the 
power to remove difficulty” according to the constitution of 1990.244 
While the parties continued their bickering over power sharing, the King became 
more influential in politics. His rising ambitions ultimately persuaded him to dismiss the 
prime minister and assume direct rule in April 2005. This move changed the political 
scenario. It not only facilitated negotiations between the NCP-M and other political 
parties, but it also alarmed the nations such as the U.S.A., the UK, and India who had so 
far been supporting the government against the Maoists.245 Once the political parties 
decided to get rid of the “autocratic monarchy,” a firm alliance between the NCP-M and 
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the political parties took place and led to subsequent developments. At this time it 
became clear to all, the Maoists, political parties, and external actors, that the changing 
alignment of forces proved that the “violent line of operation had reached its culmination 
point” and it was time to resort to the political approach.246 
The negotiations in Nepal are unique in that while they failed between the 
insurgents and the state, they produced results when they took place between the 
insurgents and the parties in opposition. The alliance between the NCP-M and the 
political parties was based upon the following two fundamental understandings: first, the 
giving up of violence by the Maoists and the acceptance of a multiparty democracy, and 
second, an agreement on abolishing the monarchy and the election of a constituent 
assembly.247 For any negotiation to succeed there has to be a credible assurance that the 
parties have adequate authority and legitimacy to implement the agreements.248 In this 
case the reinstated parliament and the NCP-M both had such legitimacy and made it 
possible to implement such decisions. Despite the failure of the negotiations, it is clear 
that the NCP-M was flexible both tactically and ideologically towards negotiation. It is 
also clear that the approach taken by the insurgency remained predominantly political 
towards the end of the insurgency. It was indeed negotiations and the subsequent political 
agreements that brought an end to the insurgency and not the people’s war. 
J. PARTICIPATION IN ELECTIONS AND POPULAR SUPPORT 
Electoral participation had never been preferred by revolutionary parties that 
waged people’s war to achieve political change. We observed the outright rejection of 
elections by the Shining Path in Peru and the similar boycott of parliamentary elections 
by the CPP in the Philippines. Both of these decisions proved fatal for the movements. 
The NCP-M, in contrast, exploited the advantage of the democratic electoral practice and  
 
 
                                                 
246 Marks,“Insurgency in Nepal,” 34. 
247 Riaz and Basu, Paradise Lost: State Failure in Nepal, 160. 
248 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “When Should We Talk to Terrorists,” Special Report by United States 
Institute for Peace, no. 240 (May 2010): 6. 
 84
almost succeeded in capturing state power. The NCP-M, unlike other Maoist parties, had 
not dismissed electoral options either as an ideological deviation or as a form of political 
strategy. 
In the past, the Maoists had also participated in the democratic parliamentary 
elections.  Prominent members of what is now the NCP-M, guided by their “progressive” 
ideology, had focused their efforts in parliamentary politics by getting elected to the 
parliament in the early stages of the transition to democracy.249 In fact, the Unity Center, 
a predecessor party of the NCP-M, had emerged as the third-largest party after the 1991 
elections.250 The people’s war doctrine was thus a late development that possibly was 
borne out of the frustration of the messy democratic process that was unable to both 
manage change and rising expectations. Nevertheless, it establishes the facts that Maoists 
leaders were first, not ideologically averse to electoral politics, second, familiar with the 
electoral culture of Nepal, and last, may have continued to enjoy a degree of rapport with 
their respective constituency even during the period of armed struggle. This puts the 
NCP-M in a uniquely advantageous position as compared to other Maoist insurgencies. 
Even the shunning of electoral politics by the Maoist leadership, at least the 
faction led by Dr. Bhattarai, was in fact a result of his party not being recognized by the 
election commission during the 1994 midterm elections. This had a serious impact on the 
way the NCP-M would view electoral politics later on. The UPFN (United Peoples Front, 
Nepal), led by Dr. Bhattarai when it broke away from the Unity Center, also broke into 
two factions. One faction was led by Niranjan Vaidya and aligned with Nirmal Lama, and 
the other faction was led by Dr. Bhattarai.251 Both the factions went to the national 
election commission to register, but the commission recognized only the one supported 
by Nirmal Lama. Dr. Bhattarai responded to this by calling for a boycott of the midterm  
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elections of November 1994.252 Thus many believe that the election commission 
slamming the door on the Bhattarai-led UPFN paved the way for its giving up electoral 
politics in favor of armed revolt.253  
The NCP-M secured an electoral victory in the 2008 constituent assembly 
elections by a wide margin against the rival parties. If the election had not been 
conducted with the combination of the principles of and the proportional representation 
system (this was on the insistence of the Maoist party itself), the NCP-M would have 
secured a clear majority in the constituent assembly.254   Although the international 
community verified that the elections were largely peaceful, the opposition parties cried 
foul and accused the Maoists of violence and intimidation.255 As the International Crisis 
Group report on the elections pointed out “it was not the cleanest of campaigns … the 
NCP-M did use intimidation and coercion” but at the same time the report notes that the 
NCP-M also “exercised great restraint in the face of the possibly calculated killing of 
fifteen of its activists.”256  
It is, however, worth noting that the Maoists scored a landslide victory in the 
traditionally urban center of Kathmandu, the capitol city. This meant that the Maoist 
appeal was more than just simple intimidation. Their win in Kathmandu demonstrated 
that they did not “profit solely by preying on vulnerable rural voters” but had been able to 
gain a substantial mobilization of support for their cause.257 Many people regard this 
change of heart of the people as a “vote for change.”258 This is indicative of the mood 
that was created by the prospect of peace and change that captured the imagination of the 
Nepalese people. Further evidence that the idea of change was being endorsed is the seats 
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secured by the Terai-based parties and the parties representing indigenous and ethnic 
parties. The Terai-based party was able to become the fourth largest party in the election. 
Although violence and intimidation may have played a part in the victory of the 
NCP-M, its decision to participate in the election itself was a very bold move considering 
that it was a Maoist party coming from an armed movement. The fact that people were 
ready to vote for both “change and peace” supports the argument that a political approach 
in the end may be the answer to the Maoist quest for legitimate state capture.  
K. ANALYSIS OF OVERALL APPROACH  
The NCP-M, despite being the largest party in the Constituent Assembly of 
Nepal, is currently the major opposition party. Although it was able to force the 
incumbent prime minister to resign through street protests in June 2010, it has failed to 
garner consensus from other political parties whose support it needs to lead the 
government again.259 The NCP-M’s failure to convince other political parties is related to 
its inability to fulfill past commitments about the peace process. Looking at the 
intransigency of the other major political parties on the issues relating to the NCP-M’s 
commitments and the constitutional obstacles in electing a new prime minister, it is 
difficult to perceive that it will come back to power without completely disarming and 
severing its links with its armed group.260 No matter what the result of the current 
political stalemate, the NCP-M undoubtedly is a crucial political actor in current 
Nepalese politics.  The NCP-M has in fact reshaped Nepalese politics by successfully 
creating a counterstate through armed insurgency. It has also forced the establishment to 
co-opt its major demands and subsequently transformed the sociopolitical and cultural 
landscape of Nepal. This achievement cannot be understated and is definitely a triumph  
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for the communist movement. It is still possible for the NCP-M to get back in the seat of 
political power if it continues to demonstrate the same level of flexibility and political 
approach it so successfully adhered to in the past. 
Lawoti and Pahari attribute the success of the NCP-M to the common factors of 
ideological grounding, dynamic and innovative leadership, and a weak state. However, 
they also emphasize “Selective employment of violence” and the strong ethnic dynamics 
that were employed by the party in terms of “developing a relationship with the 
indigenous groups” for social mobilization.261  Snellinger credits the “sister (front) 
organizations” such as student and trade unions with aiding in the mobilization 
process.262 Lawoti argues that it was the ability of the NCP-M in “exploiting 
contradictions and creating opportunities” in the political realm that ultimately propelled 
the NCP-M to power.263  They fail, however, to link these factors to the basic approach 
of the insurgency that served as the lynchpin of these separate components. The political 
and social mobilization that the NCP-M was able to achieve is a result of the balance that 
it was able to maintain in response to the changing dynamics of the situation.  
In summary, we have observed that the NCP-M exercised Marxism, Leninism, 
and Maoism only as guiding principles and made regular contextual adjustments to them. 
Its leadership, mainly Prachanda and Dr. Bhattarai, was successful in sidelining 
hardliners like Mohan Vaidya within the party in order to adopt timely changes in party 
policies. The leadership was also able to come up with tangible political goals early on, 
and because of these goals they regularly participated in negotiations for both tactical and 
strategic purposes. The NCP-M also practiced the popular front strategy very well and 
used violence selectively to further its political goals. Furthermore, its extensive 
involvement in negotiations, alliance formation, and conventional political activity 
indicates that its primary approach is not predominantly military.   
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Even when we calculate the duration of the armed action in which the NCP-M 
was involved, it is observed that the NCP-M was in the state of ceasefire and negotiations 
for a combined period of approximately one year (July 2001–November 2001 and 
January 2003 –August 2003). This   is significant considering that the insurgency only 
lasted 10 years. Similarly, the NCP-M’s armed actions against the repressive elements of 
the state machinery, including the Nepalese Army, accounts for only about four years 
(January 2001–November 2003 and August 2003–November 2005) before the signing of 
the 12-point agreement.264  Thomas A. Marks notes that the NCP-M has emphasized that 
it favors a political solution to the issues in dispute, which is why it uses nonviolent 
methods such as participation in legal political activities or negotiations as an adjunct to 
violence.265 
This leads to the conclusion that the common Maoist model, strategy, and means 
applied by the Nepalese, Peruvian, and Filipino communist insurgencies helped them to 
initiate, develop, and organize the insurgency. However, the success or failure of each 
one was dependent upon the approach it ultimately took when given critical political 
opportunities. This implies that if insurgents wish to lead not only successful military 
operations but also achieve political goals, they must retain strategic flexibility (including 
the possibility of engaging in the political process). The ultimate choice of means, either 
military or political, appears to be the primary difference between these relatively similar 
Maoist insurgencies that reached such different outcomes.  
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND LESSONS LEARNED 
The findings of the comparative case study support the argument that communist 
insurgencies can develop and succeed even in the post-Cold War era. These movements 
are typically led by educated and ambitious elites who, through their “revolutionary 
voluntarism,” are able to combine the effect of existing socioeconomic and political 
grievances with the charm of a radical ideology that provides the masses with a relatively 
credible alternative to the state.266 Lawoti agrees with the idea but comments that 
although violent communist movements are possible, the insurgents may have to be 
“ultra strategic, co-opting ethnic issues and constantly changing tracks” implying that 
ideological shifts and political co-option are a minus.267 I argue that this very freedom 
from a dogmatic application of ideology and retention of strategic flexibility is exactly 
the prerequisite needed for the success of a twenty-first century insurgency, as shown by 
the outcome of the Shining Path and the CPP/NPA in comparison to the insurgency in 
Nepal.  
Similarly, it proves that even in the current global environment, the protracted 
people’s war remains a workable, efficient strategy of social mobilization, even though it 
requires some modifications. The “war” component of the insurgency can propel the 
movement to a position where it can claim to be a viable counterstate and challenge the 
state’s political legitimacy. Military success also depends upon various contextual 
features like the strength of the state in terms of the capability of its security apparatus for 
repression, the comparative level of active popular support, and the degree of both 
domestic and international legitimacy. The NCP-M built and consolidated a counterstate 
in Nepal during the first five years of the  insurgency solely on the foundation of military 
action before they finally participated in the negotiations of 2001 posing as an alternative 
state. Unlike the other insurgencies, which wanted to execute a Chinese, Russian, or  
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Cuban model of revolution based solely upon military might, the NCP-M was able to see 
that an outright military victory in the current geopolitical and security context was 
nearly impossible. 
This leads to an idea that both insurgents and counterinsurgents need to recognize. 
Neither the idealized utopian models of past revolutions nor the past successful 
counterinsurgency strategies can be made operational exactly as they were in the past in a 
new context and timeframe. The geography of Nepal neither provides vast land areas 
such as though found in China to conduct and develop base areas nor does it contain a 
huge land mass of peasants. Furthermore, support for democracy, the global war on 
terrorism, and the growing influence of economic globalization add more obstacles to 
insurgency. This argument may appear to be simplistic, but, as the cases have shown, 
both insurgents and counterinsurgents commit the same mistakes again and again. 
Because the Shining Path could not foresee the decline in its popular support due to its 
violent tactics and the CPP/NPA could not reconcile itself with the idea of a pragmatic 
ideological shift;  both met failure as a result. Similarly, the states of Peru, the 
Philippines, and Nepal all, at least initially, sought a military solution to the problem and 
were reluctant to implement far-reaching changes. The Nepalese case demonstrates that if 
“substantive reforms are not carried out incrementally in politics, major transformations 
could occur through violent rebellion,” which could be very costly.268  
These cases also highlight the extent of both the utility and limitations of a 
militarist strategy for Maoist insurgency movements in the twenty-first century. The 
utility of the militarist strategy is primarily in launching the movement and in sustaining 
it. It also allows for the development of a counterstate politically and also strengthens the 
insurgents bargaining position. On the other hand, if the the militarist strategy is pursued 
for a longer period of time, it tends to negatively affect the degree of popular support and 
results in a loss of legitimacy and results in criminalization of the movement. Most 
importantly, it is not able to create a complete victory. 
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Consequently, a political approach is needed in the insurgency at later stages to 
lead to a path of negotiation and compromise. This highlights the importance of 
continuous negotiations even if there are no immediate breakthroughs. The strategies of 
negotiation, demands for co-option and accommodation, and political participation as a 
way to end insurgencies rarely get the level of academic attention they deserve. It may be 
due to the widespread skepticism about the ultimate aims of Maoist insurgents based 
upon the classical Maoist thoughts about the utility of negotiations. But, as the Nepalese 
case has shown, it is possible to identify when the insurgents are sincere about a 
negotiated settlement. The first step that will lead to the possibility of fruitful negotiations 
is that insurgent demands are tangible and realistic. Neither the Shining Path’s nor the 
CPP/NPA’s demands were as explicit and realistic as the NCP-M’s.  The clarity of goals 
and demands of the insurgents is the key to the possibility of achieving them. 
Negotiations in this type of situation become the ultimate “means,” if not the only means, 
for an insurgency to achieve a degree of political success. Additionally, third-party 
mediation can make the state recognize that, even if drastically transformative, the 
legitimate demands of the insurgents must be addressed and can produce successful 
outcomes. The addition of an influential third party and willingness of the state to address 
the issues raised by the insurgents do not appear in the case of the Philippines.  
However, a negotiated settlement may not always lead to cooperation between 
political forces and stalemates can occur. The incumbent elites may feel defeated because 
of their inability to maintain the status quo, and the insurgents may feel that their 
revolution is incomplete. The NCP-M in Nepal is currently struggling to get back into 
power because of a lack of cooperation from other major political parties. There are two 
major issues of contention currently. One is the lack of consensus on the management of 
Maoist combatants and the other is the power sharing in the government followed by 
major debate on the nature of the political system. The NCP-M advocates a presidential 
form of government, and the other political parties propose a parliamentary form of 
government. I would argue that this stalemate is a product of the frustration of the major 
political parties because they feel that they have conceded too much to the Maoists. 
Likewise, the NCP-M feels frustrated because of its perception of having conducted an 
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incomplete revolution. Similarly, Lawoti argues that while the NCP-M has clearly 
achieved a political revolution, it has fallen short of a complete sociocultural revolution, 
and has failed to achieve an economic revolution.269 Nevertheless, it is clear from the 
case of Nepal that major transformative sociopolitical and cultural changes are possible 
through negotiated settlements. As a result of the NCP-M’s struggle, in less than 20 years 
(1990–2008) Nepal has been transformed from the world’s only Hindu Kingdom, ruled 
by an absolute monarchy, into a secular, federal republic.  
In the current globalized world where the idea of state sovereignty is increasingly 
challenged, there is a definite role for external actors, such as the regional powers and the 
international community in bringing about an end to conflicts and even in shaping the 
outcome of conflicts. This is because of the current environment where violent 
insurgencies tend to threaten not only regional security but also compromise global 
democratic spread and economic interests. This constrains the insurgents in many ways 
and helps the state. But if the insurgents are able to convincingly demonstrate that their 
demands truly represent genuine grievances existing in the society that need addressing 
and their willingness to peacefully negotiate then they can exploit external actors. Marks 
and Palmer comment that the royal coup in Nepal led to a deepening crisis within the 
state in regards to its ability to counter the rise of a counterstate. When simultaneous 
shifts in both state and counterstate were facilitated by external actors who feared either a 
complete state collapse or a Maoist takeover, they facilitated a middle path that ultimately 
suited the NCP-M.270 While neither the Shining Path nor the CPP/NPA accepted foreign 
mediation, the NCP-M openly and deliberately used Indian mediation (both 
establishment and CPI-M) in favor of abolishing the monarchy. India gave up its long-
held concept of maintaining twin pillars of stability in Nepal, a constitutional monarchy 
and democracy, for a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Similarly, many western nations 
found the demands of the NCP-M for the election of a constituent assembly to be 
appealing. This is one of the most democratic exercises coming from an insurgent 
communist party. 
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In the end, a comparison of the three insurgencies reveals that Maoist 
insurgencies that rely heavily upon the military approach by ignoring the political aspect 
are more likely to end up in failure. The Communist insurgents of the twenty-first century 
cannot depend solely upon the military-dominant classical Maoist approach because of 
the current dynamics of the war on terror and widespread support for democratic forms of 
governance. Current regional and global environments are also not conducive to pursuing 
a classic people’s war because of the involvement of nonstate actors such as human rights 
and civil liberty groups and business enterprises that share a common ideal of rejection of 
violence as a form of dissent. Thus I argue that there is a need for a balanced politico-
military approach for an insurgency to succeed in the current global context.  
Strategically, terrorist tactics in a weak state can be tremendous in tipping the balance for 
success or failure. 271 Selective violence/ terrorism during a crucial time period as a part 
of strategic pressure may still be useful.  However, indiscriminate terror such as 
employed by the Shining Path will be counterproductive. Selective violence/terrorism 
during a crucial time period as part of strategic pressure is still useful and will remain so. 
Violence, as NCP-M demonstrated, must be used within a specific scheme for it to have 
the desired effect.  
The NCP-M in Nepal is living proof that an insurgent party need not fear the 
democratic processes. What they need to ensure is that they participate in political 
competitions at the right time with the right agendas and people will be willing to give 
them a chance. The right agenda indicates the methods for addressing the genuine 
grievances, and these are the foundations on which the movements are raised. It is also 
historically true of the people that they tend to vote in favor of the rebels who effected the 
political change. The Nepali congress party that led the popular movement against the 
absolute monarchy in 1990 garnered a majority in the parliament in the ensuing election. 
It is also argued that the Nepali voters believed that only by voting the Maoists to power 
could the people keep the party from returning to violence.272   
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The counter-insurgent state needs to understand the limitations of traditional 
counterinsurgency methods that aim to defeat the insurgents. Once an insurgency 
develops it is very difficult to completely suppress them. Maoist insurgencies in 
particular, under this notion of protracted warfare, continue their armed struggles even 
after the organizations have disintegrated. Take for example Burma, Thailand, the 
Philippines, Columbia, Peru, and India where the insurgents have resurrected their 
organizations and kept up the fight even after facing severe blows.  The basic conclusion 
is that Maoist insurgencies are usually prepared to go on for a long period of time despite 
the unconducive nature of the domestic or international situation they face. Hence the 
idea of political co-option and accommodation must receive priority in government 
policies 
Governments aiming to defeat insurgency tend to either adopt a development 
approach that emphasize economic development in the affected areas to address socio-
economic grievances or a military approach to fight them with security forces. The 
approach of developing the economy  often becomes ineffective: first, because security 
and development are inextricably linked with each other, and second, because the 
struggle for authority between the state and insurgents over control of the economic 
communities puts them between a rock and a hard place. The second approach uses 
professional and effective military operations against the insurgents to force them to 
come to the negotiating table. This works as long as the state forces are professional, 
selective, and efficient, but that is rarely the case in most of the insurgencies. A third 
option is the accommodative strategy, which is to selectively accept the demands of the 
insurgency and co-opt them into the mainstream democratic political forum. I argue that a 
combination of all three is required in parallel or in sequence, but that the ultimate 
emphasis has to be on co-option and accommodation. This is primarily a political 
approach that also aims to draw from the advantageous situation created by the first two 
strategies, and it remains the only viable long-term solution for termination of a conflict. 
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